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FOREWORD
This document constitutes Volume 3 of a seven-volume Final
Report_prepared by Teledyne Brown Engineering, Huntsville, Alabama,
under NASA'Contract No. NASI0-8676, Launch Site Processing of
Hazardous Payloads_'_'rhis study required a thorough analysis of the
impact on the launch site and its operations by hazardous Space Shuttle
payloads. -\
The seven volumes of the Final Report are as follows:
-%
Volume i. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: This volume presents a
concise review of the results of the study tasks and summarizes the
principal conclusions and recommendations of the study.
Volume 2. HAZARDOUS PAYLOADS SURVEY AND ANALYSIS:
This volume presents the results of.a survey and analysis of proposed
Shuttle payloads to identify hazardous*payloads and define the character-
istics of materials and systems which make them hazardous. This task
included the development of a hazardous payl0ads ranking technique
and recommendations for processing analysis on '.helected payloads.
\
Volume 3. NORMAL PROCESSING ANALYSIS_'J'This volume
presents preliminary normal processing flow plans for three Shuttle
cargoes selected as a result of the Hazardous Payloads Survey and
Analysis Task. These three cargoes are:_
• ':_Spacelab with Advanced Technology Laboratoryj-.
• Tug, Solar Electric Propulsion Stage, and Synchronous
Earth Observatory SatellitezQ_L,-
• "_.Interim Upper Stage and a Pioneer Jupiter Probe with a
Fluorine Propulsion Unit_ .....
"_ The preliminary processing flow plans include identification of
unique facilities and GSE, processing hazards, and payload safety
related design criteria. _-_\
Volume 4. CONTINGENCY PROCESSING ANALYSIS. This
volume presents preliminary alternate processing flow plans for
contingency situations for the three Shuttle cargoes analyzed in the
Normal Processing Analysis Task.
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Volume 5. CURRENT PAYLOADS SURVEY AND ANALYSIS:
This volume presents the results of a survey and analysis to determine
payloads that are currently flying and that may also fly on the Shuttle
vehicle when it becomes operational. The analysis determines
hazardous materials/systems for each of these current payloads and
recommends design and operational safety criteria for each hazardous
current payload to minimize its impact on the Shuttle Transportation
System.
Volume 6. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
POTENTIAL REQUIREMENTS: This volume presents the results of an
evaluation of the probable environmental impact of Shuttle payloads
hazardous materials and includes recommended KSC Environmental
Impact Statement Potential Requirements.
Volume 7. ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS: This
volume presents a list of special problems identified in the study which
require advanced technology study or technology development.
iii
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Payloads containing hazardous materials associated with space
vehicle launch operations have been recognized and dealt with on previ-
ous R&D space programs. However, when compared to the Shuttle
Program, these R&D space programs involved relatively few launches
with considerable time between launches. The Shuttle operational pro-
gram will have a high launch rate and in many cases individual launches
will have several independent payloads for accomplishment of separate
missions. Some of these payloads by intent will be recoverable for pur-
pose of reuse, and all must be recoverable in the sense that possible
abort situations prior to deployment have to be recognized.
Present processing schedules have been derived assuming
nominal passive payloads and nominal payload flow time. A number of
specifically safety oriented studies on Shuttle payloads has been per-
formed in recent years. However, relatively few of these have treated
ground operations in depth, and the overall impact of Shuttle payload
hazards on launch and landing site processing and procedures has not
been documented. In order to fill this gap, this ten month study was
initiated in July 1974. The overall study objectives were to uncover and
determine the hazard potential of Shuttle payloads, develop safety
oriented normal and contingency launch site processing plans for selected
cargoes that will minimize the impact on cost and schedules, and pro-
vide for environmental protection.
I. I TASK OBJECTIVES
The purpose of the normal processing analysis task was to develop
and analyze normal iaunch site processing flows for each of the cargoes
selected as a result of the hazardous payloads survey and analysis task.
These three cargoes are:
Spacelab with Advanced Technology Laboratory (ATL) and
Integrated Real Time Contamination Monitor (IRTCM).
Tug, Solar Electric Propulsion Stage (SEPS),and Synchronous
Earth Observatory Satellite (SEOS).
Interim Upper Stage (IUS) and a Pioneer Jupiter Probe (PJP)
with a Fluorine Propulsion Unit (FzPU).
This task included the development of normal processing flow plans
to a leveI necessary to identify ali processing hazards, time lines, unique
facilities and Ground Support Equipment (GSE) requirements, safety
requirements for launch site protection, and payload safety related design
criteria.
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1.2 SCOPE
The normal processing analysis task analyzed all processing
operations relative to receiving, storing, test and checkout, integration
with the Orbiter and/or upper stage, launch preparations, and landing and
refurbishment at the launch site for the three cargoes selected as a
result of the hazardous payloads survey and analysis task.
I. 3 TASK APPROACH
Figure i illustrates the analysis approach for the normal pro-
cessing and hazards analysis of the three cargoes selected and approved
by KSC for analysis in this task.
The philosophy was to develop a processing plan that was a
balance between safety considerations and processing constraints. Our
goal was to minimize on-line processing and at the same time minimize
personnel exposure to hazards, minimize exposure of payloads to other
payload hazards, and minimize Orbiter exposure to payload hazards.
In developing the normal processing flow, the first step was to
develop a processing scenario for each cargo showing the major pro-
cessing steps and processing locations. Data from KSC's Launch Site
Accommodations Handbook for Shuttle Payloads were used as a basis for
developing the initial top-level scenarios. KSC Shuttle Operations
Planning Office's time line allocations along with facLlities planning data
from the Shuttle Projects Office and discussion with KSC personnel were
used as additional information sources for developing the scenarios.
A top-level flow was then developed to show individual payload
operations, cargo operations, launch operations, and post-launch opera-
tions. This top-level flow is essentially an index of operations at differ-
ent areas and was expanded into a detailed operational sequence for each
cargo. This was an iterative process and the normal base line flows
were revised several times.
For each individual operation on the normal flows, a functional
event sheet was prepared to define the operation to a level necessary to
identify all hazards, estimate operations times, and identify GSE. For
each hazard identified, a Hazard Mode Eflects Analysis (HMEA) was
performed to determine the potent{at hazard effect. A support equipment
listing was prepared for the GSE and facility requirements for processing
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operations that were identified. From this listing, a support equipment
identification sheet was prepared for the items that were new, peculiar,
or associated with hazardous operations.
A waterfall/time line chart was prepared to show the normal
processing sequence of operations and the processing time line. The
time lines noted in this report are not valid in every case because they
were obtained in the early part of the study and have since changed.
The time lines, however, have no impact on the intent of the study.
For the latest valid times to correlate with specific Teledyne Brown
Engineering (TBE) time lines, see the following documents:
NAME OF DOCUMENT CONTACT
KSC Spacelab Operational Turnaround
Allocation, March 17, 1975
F. Bryan, LO
Shuttle /Tug Turnaround Allocation,
December 16, 1974
Don E. Phillips,
SP-OPN
Level III Shuttle Turnaround Allocation
Payload installation at Orbiter Processing
Facility, April I, 1975
Don E. Phillips,
SP-OPN
Level III Shuttle Turnaround Allocation
Payload Installation at Launch Pad,
April l, 1975
Don E. Phillips,
SP-OPN
I. 4 SUMMAR Y OF RESULTS
1.4.1 Cargo Hazards
The three cargoe_ normal base line processing flows and
functional event descriptions resulted in the identification of 28 different
types of hazards distributed throughout 237 operational events. An
analysis of each event, of the operations involved, and of the hazardous
systems was performed to determine the effect of the hazard on per-
sonnel, facilities, payloads, Orbiter, and the environment. To reduce
or eliminate the effects of the payload hazards, 87 payload design
recommendations were made, 125 safety related operational require-
ments were identified, and 57 items/requirements for support equip-
ment were generated. The hazards that were identified for each of the
three cargoes, the frequency of occurrence, and the final hazard
categorization are shown in Table I.
4
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CARGO HAZARDS SUMMARY
Frequency o[ Occurrence Final Ha,r _rd
Hazard Types Space L,b Tug IUS Cate_ori,' _:_on
High Pressure 7 18 15 Catastro_::c
Cryogenic F Z Overpressure 5 1 Catastrt-_hic _nd
4 Critical
Hydrazine h Methyl Derivatives 6 5 Crxtical
Mercury 2 Critical
APS Thruster Firing - Toxic Gas 2 2 Critical
Cryogenic O 2 3 Critical
Cryogenic H 2 4 Critical
CF 2 l Critical
Cryogenic F 2 2 Critical
N204 2 1 Critical and
I Controlled
GN 2 Purge l 15 6 Controltec
Electrical Power 6 Z6 13 Contro!led
RF Emissions 4 3 Controlled
Laser 2 L Controlled
High Temperature l l Controlled
Moving EqLtipment 1 Controlled
Freon 3 Contro:lec
Fh/rotechnics - Saled 5 2 Controilec
Pyrotechnics - Armed Z 2, 1 Controllec
Batteries 4 1 Controllcc
Hydraulics 1 Controlled
Purge with Hot GN 2 1 Controlled
Radar 2 Control|co
Steam Generator 2 Controlled
Microbiological 3 Controlled
Cryogenzc N;, 5 Controlled
Radiological 2 Controlled
Krypton 85 Z Controlled
1.4.2 Interface Hazards
Those operational events containing more than one hazard and
those operations where hazards were continued from previous events
were examined for possible interface hazards.
In the Spacelab/ATL/LRTCM cargo, two events were found to
present an interface hazard potential and both of these involved electrical
power application checks that could lead to the inadvertent activation
of other hazardous sources such as laser, radar, or steam generator.
The major interface hazards for the IUS/FzPU/PJP cargo are
centered around fluorine and other hypergolic materials such as hydrazine
and NzO 4. The potentially catastrophic effect of a water leak from the
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) cooling jackets combining
with a fluorine leak is also an interaction hazard. Fluorine leakages
could adversely affect critical electronics and control circuits.
In the Tug/SEPS/SEOS cargo, the i0 events found to present
an interface hazard potential had as their common causative or accessory
hazard the application or use of electrical power. Electrical power
application usually involves checks, tests,and/or verification of various
communications networks, control systems, and interfaces. The elec-
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trical power application can lead to the inadvertent activation of other
hazardous sources, such as IRF generating systems, lasers, heaters or
thruster gimbals. Mercury leakage could also cause electrical shorts,
arcing, and affect critical circuits.
In all cargoes, the application of electrical power or mal-
function in an electrical system could lead to the ignition of spilled or
leaking fuels. Similarly, inadvertent power application to pyrotechnic
devices could result in the ignition of other fuel soulces. Finally, the
presence of propellant reactants (LO2, LHz, LF2, N204, and N2H4)
presents a potentially catastrophic situation if simultaneous leakages
should occur.
1.4.3 Time Line Analysis
The time line analysis conducted revealed that no Orbiter con-
straints are imposed. For safety reasons, it was necessary to perform
off-line loading of fluorine in the F2PU. This operation involves passi-
ration, loading, stabilizing, and monitoring, which is a 31-hr operation.
Obviously, without off-line fluorine loading the Orbiter processing would
have been impacted.
1.4.4 GSE/Facility Identification for Normal Processing
Fifty seven items of GSE/facility were identified for the normal
processing of all three cargoes. The items that may cause a significant
impact on KSC are as follows:
GSE
_.IUS/F2PU Cargo Transporter (LN 2 Dewar and Monitoring
System)
--Portable Fluorine Disposal Unit and LN Z Dewar for use at:
-Fluorine Loading Facility
-SAEF # I
-Launch Pad
--Personal Life Support Equipment Compatible with Fluorine
--Fluorine Sensing Systems
--Mercury Servicing Unit
--Mercury Sensing Systems
6
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Facilities
-- Dedicated Fluorine Facility
-- Hydrazine APS Dedicated Loading Area in SAEF #1
-- Mobile Biological Holding Facility
-- Laser Test Facility
1.4. 5 Principal Conclusions and Recommendations
The primary findings, conclusions, and recommendations that
resulted from this task are as follows:
• Fluorine
Because of the hazardous characteristics of fluorine and
the time required for passivations, loading, and thermal
stabilization (31 hr ) fluorine loading should be performed
off line.
A special fluorine loading facility designed/dedicated
only to fluorine loading/unloading is required to provide
personnel and environmental protection during this
hazardous operation.
The fluorine loading facility will require almost continual
maintenance/service between periods of usage to maintain
the facility in a condition that can safely handle F 2. This
is due to the corrosive and reactive nature of fluorine
that requires that all lines, tanks, valves, etc., be
maintained in a dry inert condition, and that alter each
use, the system be completely purged to remove F Z in
order to prevent severe corrosion. If these are
relatively long periods between use, it may be necessary
to disassemble and inspect a large part of the facility
before use.
The fluorine propulsion unit oxidizer system should be
designed to allow in-space pressurization (to operating
pressure).
-- The FzPU must be designed such that it can be processed
as a separate unit from the PJP.
7
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Onboard LN Z cooling system for FzPU will be required
to maintain thermal balance and pressure level until the
unit is in orbit.
Ground cooling with LN 2 is required through the Orbiter
T-0 umbilical to reduce the required supply of onboard
supply of LN 2 cooling.
Mercury
Mercury propellant should be loaded off-line in an area
to prevent spills from contaminating the facility, Orbiter,
other payloads, or the environment. This is primarily
due to the dispersive nature of mercury and difficulty in
cleanup.
Mercury servicing provisions should be provided by a
portable servicing unit and should include storage tank,
valves, lines, etc.
A vacuum system with a filtered exhaust for spill cleanup,
a vacuum pipette system for picking up small particles,
splash pans and spill aprons should also be provided for
mercury servicing.
Microbiological Species
Biological sample containers for transfer and flight must
be fail safe (double walled, and include biocide to render
specimens harmless if inside container is damaged).
A biological facility and mobile biological unit will be
required for preparation and transporting biological/
microorganisms to prevent release of any pathogenic
hazards.
-- Trained and equipped biological survey/decontamination
teams will be required.
Radiological - RTG' s
-- Cooling Requirements
External water cooling system must be provided for
pad operations (recommend through the Orbiter T-O
umbilical).
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- Requires onboard water cooling system.
-- Radiation Exposure Hazards
Special handling equipment, fixtures and facilities
required to limit radiation exposure of operating
personnel.
Unit(s) must be installed in cargo/Orbiter as late
in processing sequence as possible to limit radiation
exposure of personnel.
General
Final pressurization of high pressure systems must be
performed at the pad late in the countdown (before crew
boards).
Final pressurization of hazardous fluid systems should
be pressurized as late in the mission as possible. Per-
forming this operation just before deployment into space
from the Orbiter for AIDS and after deployment in space
for MPS. This requires that all hazardous fluid systems
design have regulated pressurizing systems (no blowdown
systems).
All hazardous fluid systems should be pressure and leak
checked to operating pressure at KSC during ground
operations before loading. All high pressure systems
should be pressure and leak checked at KSC before
installation in the Orbiter.
It is recommended that the use of pyrotechnic devices in
payloads be minimized because many payloads have RF
generating devices (Radar, Lidar, Antenna's, etc.). It
is desirable that access to all payload pyrotechnics
Class A devices (EED's, etc.) be provided so that con-
nection could be performed after installation in the cargo
bay and disconnection could be performed before removal
in case of a pad backout.
Hazardous payloads systems and experiments which gen-
erate RF, laser beams, heat, or other energy sources
should have multiple interlocks to prevent inadvertent
actuation.
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Special facilities, covers, protection, etc. should be
provided for energy generating equipment (RF, Laser,
etc. )--i. e., laser test facility, antenna covers, RF
shields, etc.
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2 0 SPACELAO/ATL CARGO PROCESSING PLAN
2.1 CARGO DESCRIPTION
The cargo consisting of Spacelab, ATL experiments, and the
IRTCM experiment is the presently scheduled payload for the fifth operational
flight of the Shuttle flights and is designated Shuttle Mission l 1 in the
schedule for the first 2 years of Shuttle flights. The purpose of this
Shuttle mission is to deliver the first ATL, equipped by the Langley
Research Center, to orbit and perform a 7-day Sortie mission. The
ATL payload will make use of the space environment (e.g., high altitude
and velocity, weightlessness, and radiation) to develop and test a wide
variety of advanced tecbmology systems and techniques.
The flight hardware for this cargo consists of the following
major elements:
Transfer Tunnel
Core/Experiment Segment
Rack/Floor Assemblies
• Pallet
• ATL and Contamination Monitoring Experiments
Sketches showing the ATL, location of ATL/Spacelab in
Orbiter,and ATL/Spacelab Pallet configuration for this mission are
presented in Figures 2 through 4. This configuration provides a
pressurized volume for support systems and experiments and a pallet
for mounting experiments to be conducted in the environment of space.
The experiment/pallet/module groups can be handled as an integrated
unit and can be installed in or removed from theOrbiter as a unit.
2.1.1 ATL and Contamination Ivionitor_.ng Fxperirnents
The payload for this flight consists of 13 experiments selected
from ATL payloads and the LRTCM experiment. The experiment payload
consists of the following experiments:
Microwave Interferometer Navigation and Tracking Aid
• Autonomous Navigation
11
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• Search and Rescue Aids
• Imaging Radar
• Lidar Measurement of Cirrus Clouds and Lower
Stratospheric Aerosols
• Ultraviolet Meteor Spectroscopy from Near Earth
Orbit
• Colony Growth in Zero Gravity
• Interpersonal Transfer of Microorganisms in Zero
Gravity
• Electrical Characteristics of Cells
• Special Properties of Biological Cells
• Zero Gravity Steam Generator
• Sampling of Airborne Particles and Microorganisms
in Space Cabin Environment
• Environmental Effects on Nonmetallic Materials
• IRTCM.
2. I. 2 Summary of Hazardous Materials/Systems
The Spacelab/ATL/IRTCM cargo will require checkout and
servicing during processing. The following hazardous materials/systems
are carried by this cargo and are of concern in processing:
• Electrical
• Radar
• Laser
• Freon
• Steam Generator (water and silicone)
15
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2.2
in Figure 5.
• High Pressure GN 2
• Pyrotechnics (boom jettison systems)
• High Pressure GO 2
Microorganisms
PROCESSING SCENARIO
The Spacelab/ATL/IRTCM processing scenario is presented
This scenario presents the following sequence of operations:
The ATL experiments and experiment peculiar GSE
are off-loaded at the I_SC air strip and transported
to the O&C Building where they are inspected,
functionally tested, and integrated with the Spacelab
ele me nts.
The integrated Spacelab/ATL/IRTCM is transported
to the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF) where it is mated
to the Orbiter and the Orbiter integrated tests are conducted.
The Orbiter/cargo is then moved to the Vertical Assembly
Building (VAB) for Shuttle final assembly and verification.
After verification, the mobile launcher platform is moved
from the VAB to the pad.
At the pad, the experiment time critical elements
are installed, final servicing is conducted, and
countdown is initiated.
After normal mission flight and in-flight sating
operations,the Orbiter lands at the Orbiter airstrip
where sating operations are conducted.
The Orbiter is moved to the OPF where the time
critical elements and Spacelab are removed from the
Orbiter.
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The experiment elements are removed and the
Spacelab is disassembled in the O&C. The
experiment elements are prepared for trans-
porting and are returned to their respective
vendors for refurbishment. The Spacelab
elements are refurbished and either sent to
storage, or put back into operation.
In addition to the normal processing scenario discussed,
six contingency situations are presented. Two contingency situations
at the Pad are shown:
• Backout Ope rations
• Vertical Changeout
The third contingency, Mission Abort, is shown as an
alternative to the normal in-flight operations. The fourth, fifth and
sixth contingencies are:
Normal Landing at Contingency Site
Crash/Shock Condition Landing at KSC
Crash/Shock Condition Landing at Contingency Site
These are presented as alternatives to the normal landing
operations at KSC and contingency flow plans for these situations are
included in Volume 4.
2.3 PROCESSING F LOWS
This section presents the Spacelab/ATL/IRTCM Launch Site
Processing Flow Plans that were derived during this study. These flow
plans identify each major operation necessary to prepare the payload
for flight and post-flight refurbishment and acknowledge the payload
hazardous parameters that exist during these operations.
18
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A top-level flow was developed to show individual payload
operations, cargo operations, launch operations_ and post-launch
operations. This top-level flow is essentially an index of operations at
different areas and was expanded into a second level flow,which is a
detailed operational sequence for each cargo. Development of this flow
was an iterative process, and through a series of iterative tradeoffs
the normal base line processing flow plans were formed.
2.3. I Top Level
While the scanario for the Spacelab/ATL/IRTCM cargo shows
basic and essential operations to enable its processing, a slightly different
format was established to be used as a top level functional flow. The
top-level Spacelab/ATL/IRTCM Launch Site Processing Flow Plan shown
in Figure 6 is an index of processing operations. This figure shows
six major areas that provide convenient breakouts for the second level
functional flows and have been addressed at the first level. The six
major areas are:
• Payload Launch Site Processing
• Payload/Orbiter Integration and Verification
• Pad and Launch Operations
• Orbiter/Payload Post-Flight Operations
• Payload Launch Site Post-Mission Processing
• Spacelab/Pallet Refurbishment Operations
2.3.2 Normal Base Line
The Spacelab/ATL/IRTCM second level functional flow
diagram referred to as the normal base line processing flow is an
expansion of the first level with sufficient details to enable a hazards
analysis to be performed from the second level functional event sheets.
The Normal Base line Processing Flow represents the output
of an iterative process. Many feasible options in sequencing certain
19
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activities were examined to weigh their respective advantages and dis-
advantages considering the parameters of safety, time, and facilities.
Through this process so'ae hazardous operations were either eliminated,
reduced, or replaced by less hazardous ones, or the sequence and/or
locations changed so as to have a lesser impact. This process led to
the evolvement of the normal base line processing flow. For each
individual item on these flows, a functional event sheet was prepared
to define the operation to a level necessary to identify all hazards,
estimate operations times, and identify GSE.
Certain basic assumptions were made during the formulation
of the normal base line processing flows:
It is assumed that an ordnance jettison system
will be included in experiment design to eject
the extended portions of experiments if they
are not able to retract at the end of experiment
operations.
It is assumed that all these pyrotechnic devices
can be installed and connected in the horizontal
position prior to Orbiter payload bay door
closing.
The Norma] Base line Processing Flow for the Spacelab/
ATL/IRCTM is shown in Figure 7. This processing flow covers the
Spacelab processiPq from receipt at [<SC through launch, landing, and
refurbishment. Hazardous operations and hazard sources are indicated
for each operation.
O Hazardous operation, hazardous system activation,or termination of hazardous system operation. Thehazard source and reference hazard analysis are
shown.
Initiation of a hazardous operation or loading of a
hazardous system which continues throughout sub-
sequent processing operation or until terminated.
The hazard source and reference hazard analysis
are shown.
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Z.3.3 Major Options to Normal Base Line and Tradeoff Studies
In the development of the normal base line processing flows,
alternate flow plans were studied and analyzed to develop the optimum
operational sequence of flow for processing the Spacelab/ATL/LRTCM
cargo. These options present areas of the normal baseline processing
flow concept that required additional study and tradeoff to ensure the
selection and development of the most feasible and time/cost effective
as far as safety aspects are concerned.
An area of concern for this cargo was the experiment
biological specimen loading approach, Two options to the selected
normal base line concept were investigated:
Load specimens at Olaf with Orbiter in horizontal
position,
• Provide specimen refrigerator in Orbiter cabin.
The first alternate specimen loading approach is to load the
specimens while in the OPF and in the horizontal position. This alternative
requires continuous power to the Spacelab until launch, which is a potential
hazard. It also requires monitoring the environment around the
specimens until launch.
The other alternate approach would require the addition of
a specimen refrigerator in the Orbiter cabin for storage during launch,
after which the crew would carry the specimens to the ATL refrigerator
under zero-g conditions. Here, of course, there are space and weight
impacts on the Orbiter. The advantages of this method are that loading
can be performed at the time of crew boarding. Removal can be performed
during flight/crew exchange at the landing area. The disadvantage of this
approach from a safety viewpoint is that if the biological samples are
inadvertently released, the Orbiter cabin atmosphere can be contaminated.
2.4 FUNCTIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION
The purpose of these functional event sheets are to describe
each Spacelab/ATL/IRTCM processing operation, give the sequence
of events required to complete the operation, and estimate the time
required. For each event in the operation, potential hazardous conditions
are noted and cross-referenced to a hazards analysis. GSE and facilities
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associated with this operation are also shown. Hazardous materials
or systems loaded or activated in a previous operation are indicated by
hazard category.
The operation sequence of events portion of these functional
event sheets defines each of the Spacelab/ATL/IRTCM normal base line
processing flow operations to a level necessary to identify all hazards,
estimate operations times, and identify GSE. Fifty-seven normal base
line processing flow operations were identified for the Spacelab/ATL/
IRTCM cargo. Potentialhazardous conditions were identified as being
associated with 17 of these 57 operations.
The functional event sheets for the Spacelab/ATL/IRTCM
normal base line processing flow operations are included in Appendix A.
2.5 WATERFALL/TIME LINE
The Spacelab/ATL/IRTCM Waterfall/Time Line provides a
visual guide to the series and parallel relationship of the various pro-
cessing flow operations. The processing flow operations were base
lined early in this study in accordance with KSC Spacelab Operational
Turnaround Allocation, August 28, 1974. These time lines were not
updated by subsequent changes or modifications to the operational
allocations since these changes were not detrimental to the results of
this study.
The numbers and titles appearing on the events refer to the
Spacelab/ATL/IRTCM normal base line processing flow diagram item.
2.5.1 Normal Base Line
The normal base line processing flow time line for the Spacelab/
ATL/IRTCM cargo is illustrated in Figure 8. This cargo is received,
checked out, and assembled in the O&C Building at KSC. This cargo is
then moved to the OPF to be installed in the Orbiter cargo bay at
approximately 91 hr prior to launch. The on-line processing operations
require approximately 27 hr in the OPF and 38 hr in the VAB. The time
at the pad for the cargo is approximately 17 hr.
Operations of interest for this cargo are loading an unloading
of the biological specimens. These specimens must be refrigerated
continuously. Therefore, they are not loaded until about T-4 hr, when
the pad is opened after Orbiter servicing. At this time the spacecraft
has power and the refrigerator is operational. Removal of the specimens
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is accomplished when the payload doors are opened in the OPF. Power
and monitoring are required onboard until the specimens are removed.
z.6 GSE AND FACILITY REQUIREMENTS
This section presents the major GSE and facility requirements
for processing operations that have been identified as a result of the
processing flows. These items are recognized as essential for the
successful processing of the cargo.
Any experiment unique GSE will be furnished by the user,
with the possible exception of transportation items or other items KSC
may agree to furnish upon request. It was originally planned that specific
experiment equipment would also be identified. However, there is insuffi-
cient information available to be definitive of particular experiments.
Some facility requirements were envisaged to support different experi-
ment groups, however.
For the Spacelab/ATL/IIRTCM cargo,a support equipment
listing of required equipment to meet specific processing requirements
and functions was prepared. From this listing, support equipment identi-
fication sheets were prepared for servicing equipment and facility items
that were new, peculiar,or associated with hazardous operations.
The support equipment listings were separated into facility
equipment, identified with a "F" number, and a Spacelab cargo, identified
with a "S" number. The "S" identification was further divided into
servicing, handling and access, electrical, transportation, and mis-
cellaneous by the addition of a appropriate second letter.
For the Spacelab/ATL/IRTCM cargo,ll items of facility
equipment and 66 items of support equipment have been recognized as
a result of the processing flows. From this listing, support equipment
identification sheets were prepared for 13 items. The title, basic
function, and description of these items are shown on these sheets. The
support equipment listing for the following Spacelab/ATL/IRTCM equip-
ment categories are included in Appendix b.
• Facility
• Spacelab Electrical
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.....................
Spacelab Handling and Access
Spacelab Tunnel Handling and Access
Spacelab Servicing
Spacelab Tunnel Servicing
Z.7 PROCESSING HAZARDS SUMMARY
Ten hazard types have been identified with 17 operational
events in the Spacelab Normal Base Line Processing Flow. These hazard
types, their HMEA number, the frequency with which they occur, and the
final hazard categorization after the application of hazard reduction
methods are as follows:
Hazard Types
HMEA
Number
Frequency Final Hazard
of Occurrence Categorization
GN 2 Purge H002
High Pressure GN2_:: H004
Electrical Power H006
Lasers H009
Freon _:: H012
Pyrotechnics--Armed _':H017
Radar H034
Steam Generator H035
High Pressure GOz ':_ H036
Mic robiological _:_ H037
i Controlled
5 I Controlled
4 Catastrophic
6 Controlled
Z Controlled
3 Contr olled
2 Controlled
Z Controlled
2 Controlled
2 Catastrophic
3 Controlled
;',:Continue or carry over to other operations and present the
possibility of interface or interaction effects during subsequent
operations.
2.7.1 Hazard Mode and Effects Analysis
Functional Event Sheets for the Spacelab Normal Processing
Base line flagged each hazardous operation for a hazard analysis. By
examining each operational event (where a hazard or hazards had been
uncovered) in conjunction with the HMEA of that type of hazard (e. g.,
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laser and electrical), a determination of the initial hazard impact on
the payload, cargo, facilities, Orbiter, and personnel was made. The
impact whether catastrophic, critical, or controlled and what was
affected, such as payload and cargo, was indicated on the Normal Pro-
cessing Base Line Flow along with the final categorization that shows
the result after the application of control measures listed on the HMEA
for that hazard type. The HMEA's for the 10 hazard types shown in
paragraph 2.7 are located in Appendix E.
2.7.2 Interface Hazards
If the hazard were a "one event only" hazard, it was indicated
by a hexagon on the processing flowchart. If the hazard were one that
would continue over several operational events, it was indicated by a
circle and a line was run from the source event to the terminal event
where the hazard was closed out with a hexagon. Events containing
more than one hazard may have interface hazards associated with them,
and also, events where hazards are continued from previous events
operating on or operated on by an event initiated hazard can also have
interface hazards. In this manner, the processing flow clearly shows
all possible hazard interactions for each operation.
An interface hazard represents a potential accident type that
could occur if one hazard source were to go out of control (an accident)
and operate on another hazard source causing it to go out of control. In
accidents resulting from an interface, the combined effects are often
different and/or worse than the singular uncombined effects of either.
In Spacelab/ATL Normal Base Line Processing Flow, two
events present interface potential. These are as follows:
• Event 2. 03--Interface Connect and Verify
• Event 2.05--Orbiter Integrated Tests
In both of these events, power is applied to make checks and
verification of various electrical networks. Inadvertent activation of
the laser, radar, or steam generator has the potential of injuring
personnel and/or damaging the cargo and the Orbiter.
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2.8 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND LAUNCH SITE PROTECTION
Identification of the I0 types of hazards associated with the
Spacelab Normal Base Line Processing Flow has presented the requirement
for providing recommendations and/or preventative measures that could
help to alleviate the severity/occurrence of the hazard. The detailed
safety, operational and facility requirements for each of these I0
hazards are presented in Appendix E. A summary of the more pertinent
requirements that have been established for each of the identified hazards
are:
• GN Z Purge (H002)
The prevention of personnel injury from asphyxiation
can be effected most readily by limiting the access of
personnel to areas where purge operations are being
conducted, and to provide proper ventilation or self-
contained breathing apparatus for those persons that
must enter the area. Proper use of restraints or
tiedowns and vent/relief capability can help preclude
rupture of high pressure vessels and lines, and
thereby prevent damage to personnel and equipment
caused by whipping of unsecured lines, etc.
• High Pressure GN 2 (H004)
High pressure testing or checking of tanks/lines/fittings
always presents the hazard of a rupture or burst that
could result in personnel injury and damage to facilities
and equipment. Remote operation or where required,
provision for restricted access and appropriate caution
and warning procedures can considerably reduce the
exposure of personnel to such hazards.
• Electrical Power (H006)
Probably the single most effective means for preventing
electrical shock to personnel is through the use of
Ground Fault Interrupter (GFI) devices. The use of
proper operational procedures, checklists,and safety
interlocks will help prevent the inadvertent creation of
associated electrical hazards,such as arcing and high
34
'_I"TELEDYNE
BROWN ENGINEERING
voltage discharge, which can result in fires
and damage to equipment.
Laser (H009)
A laser checkout facility should be used to limit access
to the area during testing, and to provide barriers
and curtains to contain the reflected light. Eye shields
should be worn at all times during tests with lasers.
Freon (H012)
Adequate facility ventilation and avoidance of smoking
or open flames in the area where halocarbon vapors
may be present should preclude most hazardous
conditions to personnel from these materiaIs.
Pyrotechnics--Armed (H017)
Before removing shorting caps from Electro Explosive
Devices (EED's) and connecting pyrotechnic devices,
checks should be made for RF or magnetic fields and for
energized electrical connectors. Only essential personnel
should be allowed when Class A pyrotechnics are being
installed, checked out, and connected.
Radar (H034)
Control of this type of electromagnetic radiation is
most important to avoid personnel injury and initiati ,n
of unprotected pyrotechnic devices. The most obvious
and effective measures for controlling this radiation are
to provide covers for the equipment (antennas) when
not in operation and to provide physical barriers to
limit access during operations.
Steam Generator (H035)
Safety/operational requirements for operation of the
steam generator point out the need to verify the tank
integrity before use and to limit access to the area
during first checkout.
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• High Pressure GO 2 (H036)
Primary safety/operational requirements for working
with high pressure gaseous oxygen in addition to the
more obvious hazard of this material in contact with
combustible materials such as grease, oils, etc.,
are the need for limiting access during operations
and verification of tank integrity before use.
Microbiological (H037)
Safety requirements when working with microbiological
specimens necessitate certain precautions for the
protection of personnel, such as adherence to proper
operational and/or laboratory safety techniques,
wearing protective masks, use of hoods, gloved boxes,
etc.
2.9 PAYLOAD SAFETY RELATED RECOMMENDED CRITERIA
Identification of the 10 types of hazards associated with the
Spacelab Cargo Normal Base Line Processing Flow has also presented
the requirement for providing pertinent payload design criteria that
could help to reduce the severity or occurrence of the hazard. The
detailed criteria set forth for each of these hazards are provided in
Appendix E. A brief summary of the more significant criteria
emanating from this study are presented below:
• GN 2 Purge (H002)
No payload design requirements were found to be
applicable to this hazard.
• High Pressure GN 2 (H004)
All high pressure tanks should be designed with pressure
relief valves to limit pressure and the tanks should be
designed to limit shrapnel in case of a inadvertent
rupture or burst. Pressurized flight systems should
be connected to the Orbiter vent system to allow venting
before returning from Orbit.
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I
Electrical Power (H006)
All electrical equipment, connectors, etc. should
conform to the provisions of the National ]Electrical
Code and the applicable NASA and MIL Standards.
The designs of safety critical switches and controls
should be such that they are readily accessible in the
event of a major incident.
Laser (H009)
Safety related design features for laser operations
should include electrical/mechanical interlocks to
prevent inadvertent energizing, limits or stops to
limit pointing direction, and a C&W system to provide
a warning if the beam is out of limits.
Freon (H012)
All systems using pressurized gases should include
provisions for the relief of overpressure and for the
venting of the systems in orbit.
Pyrotechnics--Armed (HOI7)
Ordnance firing circuits must be designed so that
after one failure, a second failure will not fire the
circuit. The payload design should include the
location of the pyrotechnic initiators for easy accessi-
bility when the cargo is in the Orbiter bay. Shielding
of all leads from stray RFI is required.
Radar (H034)
Design of this equipment should include the incorporation
of power/lockout devices in addition to on/off switches
to ensure that no single failure can cause inadvertent
operation.
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Steam Generator (H035)
Safety design criteria most pertinent to the steam
generator should include the use of a power/lockout
device in addition to on/off switches to ensure that no
single failure can cause inadvertent operation, and
a steam relief valve connected to the Spacelab vent
system should be incorporated. The experiment
design should include a containment structure.
High Pressure GO 2 (H036)
Tanks should be designed with appropriate safety
factors, pressure relief devices to limit pressure,
and flight article tanks should be designed to limit
shrapnel.
Microbiological (H037)
The design of biological specimen packaging should
include provision for release of a neutralizing agent
(a biocide, etc.) in case of specimen release from
the test tubes or vials.
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3.0 IUS/F2PU/PJP CARGO PROCESSING PLAN
3.1 CARGO DESCRIPTION
The IUS/F2PU/pjp cargo consLsts of an expendable
hypergolic IUS, a FzPU , and a PJP. Each element composing this cargo
is expendable. The basic mission objective is to transport the PJP to
Jupiter to explore its atmosphere structure to a depth of 10 bars.
3.1. I Pioneer Jupiter Probe
The basic mission objective of the PJP is to determine
Jupiter's atmosphere structure and composition to a depth of 10 bars_ to
determine the location and composition r_ clouds around Jupiter, and to
measure interplanetary environment.
The mission objectives are met with a spin stabilized space-
craft that is composed of two basic units: a bus and an entry probe. The
bus with its attached entry probe will fly to Jupiter. The probe will
be aimed at Jupiter and released from the bus, which on its flyby will
act as a relay to transmit the data the probe is recording to earth.
The PJP configuration is as shown in Figure 9. The bus
unit of the PJP contains the following systems:
Structure (Equipment Compartment, Booms, and
Honeycomb Antenna)
Environmental Control (Passive Louvers and
Insulation)
Guidance, Navigation, and Control (Sun and Star
Tracking and Ground RF Command)
Propulsion (Velocity Control through Thrusters
with Hydrazine Propellant)
Attitude and Spin Control (Thrusters with Hydrazine
Propellant)
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• Tracking and Command (X&S Band TLM and 400
MHz Probe Relay Link)
• Electrical (RTG Power)
• Experiments
• Separation (Bolt Cutters and Associated Ordnance).
The bus will collect the following type of data:
• Photograph planet cloud surface with its Multispectral
Line Scan Gamera.
• Planetary atmosphere temperature, pressure, and
composition with its IR radiometer, IR spectrometer,
and its UV photometer.
• Planetary internal structure and trapped radiation as
well as interplanetary/interstellar magnetic field/
wind/cosmic rays with its magnetometer, solar
wind analyzer, and charge particle detector.
• Meteoroid flux versus size in space and near Jupiter
with its 12 penetration panels.
The Entry Probe Systems are:
Structures (Equipment Compartment)
Telemetry
Experiments
--Atmospheric composition with its Quadropole
Neutral Mass Spectrometer
--Atmospheric temperature with its thermocouple
temperature gage
--Atmospheric pressure with its transducer pressure
gage
41
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3.1.1.1
3.1.2
--Atmospheric density with its 3-axis accelerometer
-- Cloud density and altitude with its light source
nephelomete r detector.
Summary of Hazardous Materials/Systems
The general hazards associated with the PJP are as follows:
Electrical
Radiological--RTG's and Radioisotope Heater Units (RHU's)
• Hype r golic--Hyd razine
• Fire /Explosive-- Pyrotechnic s,
• High Pressure--GN 2 and GHe
• High Temperature--R TG' s
• R F (Communications).
Fluorine Propulsion Unit
Batteries
This conceptual propulsion unit is a basic blowdown type
and is composed of a closed loop LN 2 cooled fluorine oxidizer system
with mono-methyl hydrazine as its fuel element. The propellant capacity
is conceived to be between 1,500 and 3,000 lb. The ratio of propellants
is approximately Z/3 F Z and 1/3 NzH4,with tank operating pressure at
approximately 350 psig. The F 2 tank is insulated with Polyurethane
Foam and has an internal LN 2 cooling coil system. The LN Z cooling
supply can be removed for 3 to 6 hr during normal operations without
the loaded F 2 tank becoming overpressurized. The FzPU receives its
commands through the PJP, thus allowing a very simple and straight
forward design. The design configuration of this fluorine stage has not
been fully developed and is based on a preliminary concept only.
This propulsion unit contains the following major systems:
A closed loop F 2 oxidizer system with fill and vent
capabilitie s
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• A LN 2 cooling system for the F 2 tank
• A mono-methyl hydrazine fuel system with fill
and drain capabilities
• An engine system
• A spin/despin and separation system
• A structure system
3. 1.2. 1 Summary of Hazardous Materials/Systems
The general hazards associated with this propulsion unit are:
• Hype rgolic - -Mono -Methyl Hydrazine
• Hypergolic/Cryogenic--Fluorine
• High Pressure__GN2, GHe
• Fire/Explosive--Pyrotechnics
• Electrical
• Cryogenic--LN g Cooling
3. I. 3 Interim Upper Stage
The IUS is a three-axis stabilized stage with guidance using
storable propellants and pressure-fed engines designed to deliver a
5,000 Ib payload from low earth orbit to synchronous orbit and to escape
velocity. The expendable IUS is a 120-in. diam 230-in. long stage
that has a utility life limit of 8 hr. The IUS/Payload mounted in the
Orbiter cargo bay rests in a cradle that is attached to four Orbiter mount
fittings. The IUS has an umbilical connection to the cradle that is separated
before the Orbiter Remote Manipulating System (RMS) lifts the IUS/payload
free of the cradle, out of the cargo bay, to a release point above the Orbiter.
The IUS configuration is shown in Figure i0. A general
description of the IUS systems follows:
• Attitude Control System (ACSh Monopropellant
hydrazine stored under helium pressure in spherical
tanks.
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Electrical Power System (EPS): Battery with vent
operates with GH 2 under normal operation and produces
KOH during failure mode.
IUS Main Propulsion System (MPS): Main propulsion
system provides 16,000 Ib maximum thrust. The
main propellant, UDMH/NzH 4 and N204 are pressurized
from the helium pressurization system.
Other systems to be checked out during ground processing
include instrumentation, communication, data management, guidance,
navigation, and control system.
3. I. 3. 1 Summary of Hazardous Materials/Systems
The IUS contains the following general hazards:
• N204 Oxidizer
• N2H 4 and UDMH/N2H 4
• Batteries
• GN 2 and Helium
• Electrical
• R F- -Communications.
3.2 PROCESSING SCENARIO
The IUS/FzPU/PJP processing scenario shows a likely
sequence of operations essential to process this cargo for the prelaunch
and launch phases of its operational cycle. Buildings and areas have been
identified that most reasonably accommodate the major operations
required to process the individual elements (IUS/FzPU/PJP) of this
cargo as well as those for the combined cargo.
Throughout the analysis there has been a continuous endeavor
to evolve the best practical sequence of activities for a reasonably safe
and timely set of prelaunch and launch processing plans. This has been
reflected in our selection of the relative placement of activities with
respect to one another and the location where performed.
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as follows:
The scenario (Figure II) covers the full cycle of operations
The PJP is off-loaded at KSC airstrip and moved
from the airstrip to the AO Hanger where it is
inspected, shipped loose parts assemblied, functionally
tested, and leak checked.
The FzPU and IUS are off-loaded at KSC airstrip
and transported to SAEF #I where they are inspected,
shipped loose parts assembled, functionally tested, and
leak checked. The IUS APS is loaded at SAEF #I
where in the case of FzPU and PJP, the APS is
loaded and test fired in Propellant Lab 60A.,
After APS test firing, the F2PU is transferred to
the fluorine facility where fluorine is loaded and the
system stabilized, The F2PU and PJP are then
moved to SAEF #i where they are mated with the IUS.
The mated cargo is moved to the pad and lifted from
the transporter into the PCR.
The cargo is then loaded into the Orbiter bay and
Orbiter/cargo interfaces are mated and verified.
The RTG's that were off-loaded, received, inspected,
and tested at the S.A_EF #i area in Building MT-147Z
are now installed in the cargo and tested. The Orbiter
bay is closed, PCR is retracted, and countdown is
initiated.
In addition to the normal processing scenario discussed,
three contingency situations are presented. Two contingency situations
at the pad are shown:
• Backout Operations
Vertical Changeout at Pad
The third contingency, Mission Abort, is shown as an alter-
native to the normal in-flight operations.
The flow plans for these contingency situations are included
in Volume 4.
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3.3 PROCESSING FLOWS
This section presents the IUS/FzPU/PJP Launch Site Pro-
cessing Flow Plans that were derived during this study. These flow
plans identify each major operation necessary to prepare the payload
for flight and acknowledge the payload hazardous parameters that
exist during these operations.
A top-level flow was developed to show individual payload
operations, cargo operations, and launch operations. This top-level
flow is essentially an index of operations at different areas and was
expanded into a second level flow that is a detailed operational sequence
for each cargo. Development of this flow was an interative process and
through a series of iterative tradeoffs, the normal base line processing
flow plans were formed.
3.3. 1 Top-Level
While the scenario for the IUS/F2PU/PJP cargo shows basic
and essential operations to enable its processing, a slightly different format
was established to be used as a top-level functional flow. The top level
IUS/F2PU/PJP Launch Site Processing Flow Plan is shown in Figure IZ.
This figure shows six major areas that provide convenient breakouts
for the second level functional flows and have been addressed at the first
level. The six major areas are:
• 1.0 Premate IUS Processing
2.0 Premate F2PU Processing
• 3.0 Premate PJP Processing
• 4.0 IUS/FzPU/PJP Integration
5. 0 Cargo to Orbiter Integration and Pad Operations
• 6.0 Premate RTG Processing
3.3.2 Normal Base Line
The IUS/F2PU/PJP second level functional flow diagram
referred to as the normal base line processing flow is an expansion of
the first level with sufficient details to enable a hazards analysis to be
performed from the second level functional event sheets.
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The Normal Base Line Processing Flow (Figure 13) represents the
output of an iterative process. Many feasible options in sequencing certain
activities were examined to weigh their respective advantages and dis-
advantages, considering the parameters of safety, time, and facilities.
Through this process some hazardous operations were either eliminated,
reduced, or replaced by less hazardous ones, or the sequence and/or
locations changed so as to have a lesser impact. This process led to
the evolvement of the normal base line processing flow. For each
individual item on these flows, a functional event sheet was prepared to
define the operation to a level necessary to identify all hazards, estimate
operations times, and identify GSE.
Certain basic assumptions and criteria were established
during the formulation of the normal base line processing flows. These
are discussed as follows:
SAEF #1, or another Tug processing facility,
would handle processing of the Tug, IUS, and
cargo mating operations.
The Shuttle payload flow at KSC would require
utilization of all available facilities. Propellant
Lab 60Awould be used for some off-pad payload
propellant loading, and APS propellants for some
payloads would be loaded in this facility.
Upper stages and payload APS systems would
be test fired to verify operations and wet system
seals before launch.
Lab 60A will not handle a IUS/I_zPU/Propellant
PJP cargo or a Tug/SEPS/SEOS cargo because
of size limitations.
The Tug and IUS and their cargoes would be
processed in the vertical position.
The Tug and the IUS and their cargoes would be
mated into the Orbiter at the pad through the
payload changeout room.
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3.3.3 Options to Normal Base Line
3.3.3. 1 Fluorine Loading
Many options are available for loading the fluorine
oxidizer in the FzPU payload. The first option studied was loading at
the pad in the Orbiter bay. An alternate pad loading optionthat had
been considered by other fluorine studies was loading in the payload
changeout room. Both of the options were investigated from a time and
hazards standpoint and were found to be impractical.
The primary problem with fluorine loading operations is the
severe consequences of a spill or leak that is most likely to occur
during propellant transfer. Fluorine reacts with most materials and
is extremely corrosive to many metals. Also, the consequences
of a major spill would have a pronounced effect on the environment and
pose a hazard to personnel in the area and to the general public. The hazards
of fluorine operations alone are sufficient to reject pad loading, but the
time required to passivate, load, and thermally balance the LF Z tank
is approximately 31 hr, This time prohibits loading in the cargo
bay regardless of hazards and would tie up and restrict access to the
pad area for 31 hr if the payload changeout room were used for loading.
For these reasons, it was determined that all fluorine loading
operations should be performed off-line in a remotely located facility
designed especially for controlling hazardous fluorine operations.
The next fluorine processing option to be considered is where
in the processing cycle the fluorine is to be loaded. The obvious
choice is to perform all cargo integration functions and load the fluorine
just before the cargo is ready for transport to the payload changeout
room. This option minimizes the handling and exposure of personnel
to the fluorine stage. However, considering the extremely corrosive
effect of F Z vapors on electronic and electrical equipment and that the
highest likelihood of F Z vapors being present is during the F Z passiva-
tion and loading it was concluded that IUS and PJP critical electronics
damage would be likely using this approach. Also, loading F Z after
integrating the payloads would result in the cargo having to repeat most
of the testing performed during earlier payload and cargo testing. This
repeat testing would require as much personnel exposure to F Z as the
approach selected and almost double the required cargo testing. If a
circuit were effected by F Z vapors during loading, to repair or
replace the element would also prolong the processing time and increase
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personnel exposure to F 2. However, after a F 2 system is properly
passivated, loaded, and stabilized, the likelihood of F 2 vapors leaking is
much smaller. These considerations resulted in our recommending
loading of the F 2 prior to integration with the other payloads. This
recommendation is based on the assumption that the LF 2 tank cooling
concept can maintain the cryogenic fluorine pressure near atmospheric
pressure. This may require a pressurization system for flight press-
urization of the LF 2 system.
3.4 FUNCTIONAL EVENTS DESCRIPTION
The purpose of these functional event sheets is to describe
each IUS/F2PU/PJP processing operation; give the sequence of events
required to complete the operation, and estimate the time required. For
each event in the operation, potential hazardous conditions are noted
and cross-referenced to a hazards analysis. GSE and facilities associ-
atedwith this operation are also shown. Hazardous materials or systems
loaded or activated in a previous operation are indicated by hazard
category.
The operation sequence portion of these functional event
sheets defines each of the IUS/FzPU/PJP normal base line processing
flow operations to a level necessary to identify all hazards, estimate
operations times, and identify GSE. Seventy-nine normal base line
processing flow operations were identified for the IUS/F21DU/PJP cargo.
Hazardous conditions were identified with 46 of these 79 operations.
79 operations.
The functional event sheets for the IUS/F2PU/PJP normal
base line processing flow operations are in Appendix B.
3.5 WATERFALL/TIME LINE
The IUS/FzPU/pJp Waterfall/Time line provides a visual
guide to the series and parallel relationship of the various processing
flow operations and are time-phased to show the time allocation for each
operation. The processing flow operations were base lined early in this
study in accordance with KSC Shuttle/Tug Turnaround Allocation,
December 16, 1974. These time lines were not updated by subsequent
changes or modifications to the operational allocations since these
changes were not detrimental to the results of this study. The numbers
and titles appearing on the events refer to the IUS/F2PU/PJP functional
flow diagram item numbers.
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3.5.1 Normal Base Line
The normal base line processing flow time line is illustrated
in Figure 14. This time line shows the complete flow of each element
of this cargo from arrival at KSC to launch. This time line includes
approximately 55 hr prior to Orbiter landing for off-line receipt, inspec-
tion, and assembly of the PJP. The IUS, PJP, and FzPU are individuaIly
followed (through SAEF #1, AO Hanger, F 2 loading facility, and Propellant
Lab 60A) until they are mated into an integrated cargo at approximately
5?. hr prior to launch. The RTG's for this cargo are received and tested
off-line and then mated to spacecraft on the pad. The pad time for this
cargo is 30 hr. The Shuttle events for this time line are referenced but
not identified.
Fluorine loading for the FzPU elements is off-line because
the loading and thermal balancing is very hazardous and loading off-Iine
reduces the Orbiter, PJP, and IUS exposure to a hazardous operation.
The decision to perform the F Z loading off-line was based
in part on the following considerations:
First, a good safety criterion is to isolate hazardous
operations as much as practical, especially when the
type of operation is not commonly performed and the
experience level is low. Of particular concern here
is the escape of extremely corrosive F 2 vapors and
the damage it could cause to the Orbiter, IUS, or
PJP eIectricai and electronic components.
Second, the 31 hr required to passivate, load,
stabilize, and monitor the system integrity would
have an adverse impact on the Orbiter time line if
performed at the pad.
3.6 GSE AND FACILITY REQUIREMENTS
This section presents the major GSE and facility requirements
for processing operations that have been identified as a result of the
processing flows. These items are recognized as essential for the
successful processing of the cargo.
Any experiment unique GSE will be furnished by the user,
with the possible exception of transportation items or other items KSC
may agree to furnish upon request. It was originally planned that specific
experiment equipment would also be identified. However, there is
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insufficient information available to be definitive of particular experi-
ments. Some facility requirements were envisaged to support different
experiment groups, however.
For the IUS/FzPU/PJP cargo, a support equipment listing of
required equipment to meet specific processing requirements and
functions was prepared. From this listing, support equipment identi-
fication sheets were prepared for servicing equipment and facility items
that were new, peculiar, or associated with hazardous operations.
The support equipment listings were separated into facility
equipment, identified with a "F" number, and a powered cargo, identified
with a "im'' number. The "P" identification was further divided into
servicing, handling and access, electrical, transportation, and mis-
cellaneous by the addition of a appropriate second letter.
For the IUS/FzPU/PJP cargo, 23 items of facility equipment
and approximately 134 items of support equipment have been recognized
as a result of the processing flows. From this listing, support equipment
identification sheets were prepared for some items. The title, basic
function, and description of these items are shown on these sheets. The
support equipment listing for the following IUS/F2PU/PJP equipment
categories are included in Appendix D.
I
I
n
I
I
• Facility
• Electrical
• Handling and Access
• Servicing
• Transportation
• Miscellaneous.
3. 7 PROCESSING HAZARDS SUMMARY
Twenty-one hazards types have been identified with 46 pro-
cessing operations in the IUS/FzPU/PJP normal base line processing
flow. These hazard types, their reference DIMEA number, the frequency
with which they occur, and the final hazard categorization after appli-
cation of hazard reduction methods are as follows:
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Hazard Types
HMEA
Number
Frequency
of Occurrence
Final Hazard
Categorization
GN 2 Purge _:' H002 6 Controlled
GN_ High Pressure::, H004 8 Catastrophic
He _-{igh Pressure_: , H005 6 Catastrophic
Elect rical::-" H006 13 Controlled
RF H007 2 Controlled
N H ::4 H008 2 CriticalZ 4
Toxic Gas H014 2 Critical
Pyrot e chni c s --Safe d::= H015 Z C ont r olled
Pyrotechnics --Armed _:" H017 1 Controlled
Battery ::_ H019 1 Controlled
GN_/He Pressurization HOZZ 1 Critical
GF- z H025 I Critical
LN z_:" H026 5 Controlled
LF- z::'_ H028 Z 2 Critical
Rac_iological ;:: H029 1 Controlled
Krypton 85 H030 2 Controlled
LF 20verpressure H031 5 4 Critical and 1
Catastrophic
High Temperature :',: H032 I Controlled
R adiologi cal =_ H033 1 C ont r olled
RF H034 1 Controlled
N204 =''_ H038 2 1 Controlled and
I Critical
Also, carry over to other operations and present the possibility of
interface or interaction effects during subsequent operations.
3.7.1 Hazard Mode and Effects Analysis
Functional Event Sheets for the IUS/FzPU/PJP Normal
Processing Base Line flagged each hazardous operation for a hazard
analysis. By examining each operational event (where a hazard or
hazards had been uncovered) in conjunction with the HMEA of that type"
of hazard (e. g., laser and electrical), a determination of the initial
hazard impact on the payload, cargo, facilities, Orbiter, and personnel
was made. The impact whether catastrophic, critical, or controlled and
what was affected, such as payload and cargo, was indicated on the Normal
Processing Base Line Flow along with the final categorization that shows
the result after the application of control measures listed on the HMEA
for that hazard type. The HMEA's for the 21 hazard types are located
in Appendix E.
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3.7. Z Interface Hazards
On the Normal Base Line Flow, if a hazard were a "one event
only" hazard, it was indicated by a hexagon. If the hazard were one that
would continue over several operational events, it was indicated by a
circle and a line was run from the source event to the terminal events
where the hazard was closed out with another circle. Events containing
more than one hazard may have interface hazards associated with them,
and also, events where hazards are continued from previous events
operating on or operated on by an event initiated hazard can also have
interface hazards. In this manner, all possible interaction possibilities
from all hazard sources are clearly indicated for each operation.
An interface hazard represents a potential accident type that
could occur if one hazard source were to go out of control (an accident)
and operate on another hazard source causing it to go out of control.
In accidents resulting from an interface, the combined effects are often
different and/or worse than the singular umcombined effects of either.
In the IUS/FzPU/PJP Normal Base l..ine Processing Flow,
several events present potential interface hazards. Examples of the
major hazards are:
Leakage of fluorine can cause critical electronics/
electrical circuits to malfunction becaus_ of the
corrosiveness of fluoride. This effect could cause
critical and catastrophic failures of the cargo, payload,
or Orbiter.
A fluorine leak into the fluorine tank heat exchanger
could result in release of toxic F 2 vapors through the
LN Z cooling system vent.
Water leakage from the RTG cooling system could react
violently with a fluorine leak after installation in the
Orbiter.
Unfavorable weather conditions during transport of the
F2PU at the launch site could be a catastrophic hazard
if a fluorine leak or spill occurs.
Other interface hazards include inadvertent power applica-
tion to the pyrotechnic devices or stray RFI could result in an explosion
or fire.
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The FzPU contains both LF 2 and N2H 4 after loading the LF 2
tank. The presence of these hypergolic materials through subsequent
processing operations is a serious interaction possibility. With LF 2 as
the oxidizer, a fire or explosion would be a certainty if the two were
accidently mixed. The likelihood of leakage is reduced by applying
only a blanket pressure to the APS's and LF 2 tank until the cargo is
ready to deploy from the Orbiter in space.
3.8 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND LAUNCH SITE PROTECTION
Identification of the 21 types of hazards associated with the
IUS cargo normal base line processing flows has presented the require-
ment for providing recommendations and/or preventative measures
that could help to alleviate the severity/occurrence of the hazard. The
detailed safety operational and facility recommendations for each of
these hazards is presented in Appendix E. A summary of the more
pertinent requirements is as follows:
• GN Z Purge (H002}
Personnel injury from asphyxiation can be prevented most
readily by limiting the access of personnel to areas where purge opera-
tions are being conducted, and providing proper ventilation or self-con-
tained breathing apparatus for those persons that must enter the area.
Proper use of restraints or tiedowns and vent/relief capability can
help preclude rupture of high pressure vessels and lines, and thereby
prevent damage to personnel and equipment caused by whipping of
unsecured lines, etc.
• High Pressure GN 2 (H004) and High Pressure GHe (H005)
Testing or checking of tanks/lines/fittings always presents
the hazard of a rupture or burst that could result in personnel injury and
damage to facilities and equipment. Remote operation or, where required,
provision for restricted access, and appropriate caution and warning
procedures can considerably reduce the exposure of personnel to such
hazards.
• Electrical Power (H006)
Probably the single most effective means for preventing elec-
trical shock to personnel is through the use of GFI devices. The use of
proper operational procedures, checklists, and safety interlocks will help
prevent the inadvertent creation of associated electrical hazards, such as
arcing and high voltage discharge that can result in fires and damage to
equipment.
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• RF Emissions (H007)
The wearing of RF monitors by operating personnel can
effectively limit their exposure to such harmful radiation. All RF
generating equipment should be turned off before performing hazardous
operations, such as connecting pyrotechnics devices.
• Hydrazine and its Methyl Derivatives (H008)
The obvious requirements of wearing protective clothing,
masks and gloves and having safety showers and eye wash fountains
readily accessible will in most cases preclude an accidental spill having
a marked effect on personnel. Modifications to the SAEF #1 facility to
include a water flush system and a fresh air purge :nay be required for
loading and testing the APS safely.
• APS Thruster Firing--Toxic Gas (H014)
Test firing of these thrusters could generate toxic products
such as ammonia and hydrogen, or through malfunction could create a
spill of hydrazine. Adequate ventilation and the use of personnel pro-
tective equipment should preclude any hazard to personnel from this
ope ration.
• Pyrotechnic s--Safed (H015)
The inadvertent activation of ordnance devices can be pre-
cluded by the following proper procedures, such as using spark proof
tools, use of shorting caps, and handling and storing explosives only in
designated facilities.
• Pyrotechnics--Armed (H017)
Before removing shorting caps from EED's and connecting
pyrotechnic devices, checks should be made for RF or magnetic fields
and for energized electrical connectors.
• Batteries (H019)
Care must be exercised in handling batteries to prevent
arcing shoots and to prevent electrolytic spills. The use of nonsparking
tools and wearing of protective clothing and goggles should serve to
alleviate most of their hazards.
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• High Pressure GNz/GHe (H022)
All operations involving the test, checkout, and operation of
high pressure systems should be done remotely when possible, i.e. ,
limiting access and number of operating personnel. All GSIE servicers
should be vented and safed before disconnecting.
• cF 2 (H0ZS)
A fluorine facility that is dedicated to fluorine loading only
is required because of the highly reactive nature of fluorine. Protective
clothing and breathing systems are required for personnel working
around fluorine. Passivation of the F 2 tanks and transfer lines is
required by a special procedure because of the highly reactive nature of
fluorine.
• LN 2 (H026)
Piping and tanks should be cold shock tested and leak checked;
relief valves should be included in LN Z dewar systems; LN 2 must be vented
outside when located in the Tug Processing Facility; personnel working
around LN2,must abide by KSC safety requirements for cryogenics.
• LF z ( H0ZS )
A special transporter designed to control LF^ temperatures
and safely contain leaks during transit is required. The_oaded FzPU
shall be moved only when weather conditions are favorable and will not
aggravate the impact of a spill or leak. Also, only essential and trained
personnel with proper protective clothing and safety devices should be
allowed where fluorine operations are performed. A F 2 disposal unit is
required at the F Z facility, SAEF #I, and at the pad if emergenclr
venting is necessary.
• Radiological (H029)
.Proper radiation shielding will be required to protect per-
sonnel and equipment. Occupancy time in "radiation areas" should be
limited to that time required to properly perform assigned tasks, and
all personnel entering radiation controlled areas shali wear a beta-
gamma-neutron sensitive dosimeter. Before RTG's are installed on a
spacecraft, work shall not proceed until appropriate health physics
measurements have been completed and safe levels of exposure are
verified. Maximum distances between personnel and the radiation
source (RTG's) shall be maintained through use of proper handling
devices. All radiation areas shall be conspicuously posted.
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• Krypton 85 (H030)
Krypton 85 is used as a tracer gas for pressure testing
systems that have extremely low allowable leak rates. Tests should be
performed by personnel trained in handling and testing with a radioactive
gas. All personnel will be required to wear beta-gamma film badges.
• LF 20verpressure (H031)
The fluorine loading facility shall be used for emergency
disposal of fluorine when time allows. However, a portable fluorine
disposal unit should also be provided at SAEF #l and at the pad in the
event emergency on site venting is required. Other safety and protective
actions include maintaining an adequate supply of LN g for cooling at
all times, providing a backup cooling system for emergencies, and
providing F Z sensors at all processing locations and in the Orbiter
bay. All personnel involved in the operations with the fluorinated
oxidizer unit should be trained and certified for fluorine operations.
Emergency or contingency actions should be developed and practiced for
all possible accident situations.
• High Temperature (H032)
Personnel should wear protective garments, gloves, etc., at
all times when working with sources of high temperature. All combustible
materials must be removed from the immediate area before the heater
is energized.
• Radiological (H033)
Special storage and handling equipment are required
for RTG's to prevent exposure or direct contact by personnel with
radiation sources. Special guards and shields and radiological warning
devices are required during storage and handling. KSC Radiation Pro-
tection Handbands KHB 1860. I/IS shall be followed.
• RF (H034)
Control of this type of electromagnetic radiation is most
important to avoid personnel injury and initiation of unprotected pyro-
technic devices. The most obvious and effective measures for con-
trolling this radiation is to provide covers for the equipment (antennas)
when not in operation and to provide physical barriers to limit access
during operations.
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• Nitrogen Tetroxide._N204 (H038)
Zero leakage service disconnects and protective clothing for
operating personnel are required to prevent exposure of operations
personnel to toxic vapors. N204 gas detectors are required for the
Orbiter bay. Loading operations will be in accordance with the KSC
loading procedure for N20. and mutually reactive propellants will not be
loaded at the same time. _n the event that spills occur, they shall be
cleaned up immediately or washed down with water.
3.9 PAYLOAD SAFETY RELATED RECOMMENDED CRITERIA
Identification of the 21 types of hazards associated with
the IUS cargo normal base line processing flow has also presented the
requirement for providing pertinent payload design criteria that could
help to reduce the severity or occurrence of the hazard. The detailed
criteria set forth for each of these hazards are provided in Appendix E.
A brief summary of the more significant criteria emanating from this
study is presented below:
• GN 2 Purge (H002)
Payload GN 2 purge outlets should be located so that the GN 2
can be vented outside the Orbiter bay.
• High Pressure GN 2(H004) and He (H005)
All high pressure tanks should be designed with pressure
relief valves to limit pressure and the tanks should be designed to limit
shrapnel in case of a inadvertent rupture or burst. Pressurized flight
systems should be connected to the Orbiter vent system to allow venting
before returning from orbit.
• Electrical Power (H006)
All electrical equipment, connectors, etc., should conform to
the provisions of the National Electrical Code and the applicable NASA
and MIL Standards. The designs of safety critical switches and controls
should be such that they are readily accessible in the event of a major
incident.
• RF Emissions (H007)
Equipment that generates EMI radiation should be designed
to contain this radiation within the equipment and equipment that can
be advertently affected by RFI should have RF shielding built into its
de sign.
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• Hydrazine and its Methyl Derivatives (H008)
The Orbiter/cargo umbilicals should be designed to limit
spillage of fluids at the pad or other loading areas to a minimum. Pro-
pellant systems designs should allow pressurization at the time of
deployment from the Orbiter bay in space.
• APS Thruster Firing--Toxic Gas (H014)
Design of the APS systems should include electrical inter-
locks to produce inadvertent firing of the system, and provision should
be made to bring the A_PS system up to operating pressure only just
before deployment from the Orbiter in space. Covers or shields over
APS thrusters should be provided to prevent the release of toxic vapors
or liquids.
• Pyrotechnics--Safed (H015) and Armed (I-I017)
Ordnance firing circuits must be designed so that after one
failure, a second failure will not fire the circuit. The payload design
should include the location of the pyrotechnic initiators for easy access-
ibility when the cargo is in the Orbiter bay.
• Batteries (H019)
Battery and battery connector designs should include the use
of plug-in type connectors to cut down the possibility of arcing. The
batteries should also have adequate vents that are connected to the
Orbiter vent system that would preclude possible battery case over-
pressurization.
• GF Z (H025)
AnF Z sensor at the vent side of the heat exchanger is required
to detect possible GF 2 or LF Z leaks into the heat exchanger.
A heat exchanger in/around the F_ tanks is required to help
passivate the F 2 tank and lines prior to loadingg LF Z and control the LF 2
temperature after loading.
• Cryogenic LN g (HOZ6)
Insulation or shielding should be provided to prevent per-
sonnel contact with cryogenic temperatures.
68
"_I"TELEDYNE
BROWN ENGINEERING
• LF Z (H028)
Design of the LF Z system should allow maintenance of low
tank pressure with the LN 2 cooling system until this unit is deployed
from the Orbiter.
The FzPU should contain a minimum of electronics and
should be hermatically sealed with an F 2 compatible material.
• Radiological (RHU) (H029)
The RHU's should include sufficient shielding to prevent
exposure of operational personnel to radiation.
i Krypton 85 (H030)
No new applicable payload design requirements.
, LF 20verpressure (H03I)
Redundant pressure and temperature sensors should be
provided. The system design should include a burst diaphram for
venting after release from Orbiter in space and a remote operated vent
valve for venting into disposal unit during ground operations. The vent
system shall be designed so that no single failure allows leakage of
fluorine. Double container concepts should be considered for LF_ tank
and line design to preclude leakage. F 2 sensors should be includeZd
between containers. If F 2 dumping in space (in case of abort) is pro-
hibited, then an onboard cooling capability is required.
The LF_ system design should allow maintenance of low
tank pressure b} L_ 2 cooling until the unit is deployed from the Orbiter
in space. Final F 2 tank pressurization should be performed in space.
• High Temperature (H032)
The RTG cooling jacket design should allow installation
without personnel contact with the RTG's. Payload design should
allow for access to RTG's for installing the cooling jackets.
• Radiological (RTG) (H033)
The RTG location in the payload should allow installation and
removal after the cargo is in the Orbiter bay. The RTG design should
include adequate high temperature, fire, blast, and radiation shielding.
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• RF (H0 34)
Power/lockout devices and on/off switches should be included
to ensure that no single failure can cause inadvertent operation.
• N20 4 (H038)
Final pressurization should be delayed until just before the
cargo is deployed from the Orbiter in space.
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4.0 TUG/SEPS/SEOS CARGO PROCESSING PLAN
4.1 CARGO DESCRIPTION
The Tug/SEPS/SEOS cargo consists of the cryogenic reusable
Tug (MSFC base line configuration) and the SEOS. The SEPS is hard
docked and locked onto the Tug with explosive release mechanisms. The
SEOS is similarly attached to the SEPS. (Neither the SEPS nor SEOS is
structurally attached to the Orbiter bay.) A sketch of the Tug/SEPS/
SEOS Cargo is presented in Figure 15. A brief description of each
element of the cargo follows.
4.1.1 Tug Description
The Tug is a high energy, reusable, propulsive stage that
is carried in the Orbiter payload bay and is used to deliver/retrieve/
service spacecraft. It is capable of delivering 6000 to 800 ib to
geosynchronous orbit or retrieving 3000 to 4000 ib from geosynchronous
orbit. Within this capability, it can deliver and retrieve payloads in
low earth orbit or insert one spacecraft into an earth-escape trajectory.
The base line space Tug is composed of structures, propulsion
avionics, and thermal control systems. Figure 16 presents the current
general Tug configuration. General descriptions of these Tug systems
follows:
4. 1. 1. 1 Structure s
The Tug is structurally attached to the Orbiter cargo bay at
six points. Four attachment fittings are on the body shell; the other
two are mounted on the deployment adapter and serve as pivoting
points.
Umbilical systems between the Tug and Orbiter will be
separated prior to Tug deployment and will provide reconnect capability
for the Tug LO 2 and LH 2 vent and propellant lines, GHe inerting purge,
and those electrical functions required to maintain the Tug during the
reentry. All lines and cables between the Tug and Orbiter will be routed
along the inside of the car3o bay from the aft service points defined by
the Orbiter base line. The main propellant tank fill and drain lines and
pressurant lines are attached to interface panels in the payload bay and
are accessible for servicing through the Orbiter.
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4. 1. 1.2 Propulsion
The propulsion system provides a vacuum thrust of 15,000 ib
from a derivative of the flight-proven Pratt and Whitney RLI0 engine.
The main propellants, LH Z and LOz,are pressurized from a helium
pressurization system. The helium pressurization system consists of
two 4.5 ft3 bottles pressurized to 3200 psig.
The Tug auxiliary propulsion system provides three axis
attitude control and small AV translation maneuvers for the Tug. It is
a regulated monopropellant hydrazine system with four pods of six
thrusters each. Propellant is supplied from three hydrazine tanks
pressurized by helium.
4. 1. 1.3 Avionics
The Avionics System consists of the communications: guidance;
navigation and control; data management; measurement, power, and
distribution subsystems. The system design provides a high degree of
in-flight autonomy with ground commands generally required only for
safety inhibits, mission contingencies, and navigation updates.
The Tug electrical power is a 28 Vdc system composed of
power sources, power processing, and distribution and control equipments.
In addition to providing subsystems power, it will provide up to 600 W
of power to the spacecraft while it is attached to the Tug. While the Tug
is in the Orbiter bay, power is supplied to the Tug power bus from the
Orbiter.
The Tug power source consists of two Tug designed fuel cells
each rated at 2.0 kW with 3. 5 kW peak Each fuel cell is capable of
supplying the total load. The fuel cell system has dedicated reactant
tanks. An auxiliary battery rated at Z5 A-hr supplements in rush
current requirements for motor loads and powers up the fuel cells.
4. 1. 1.4 Thermal Conditioning
Thermal conditioning of the Tug is accomplished by both
active and passive means. The fuel cells waste heat is rejected to
space by an active thermal control system using Freon Z1 circulated by
dual redundant pumps through radiators, selector valves, a temperature
control valve,and the fuel cell heat exchanger. The forward skirt panel
mounted avionics will be cooled by lightweight radiation shields and
heated by electrical heaters controlled by the central computer. Heat
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pipes provide thermal control when the Tug is perpendicular to the sun.
The temperature of the avionics in the intertank area will be controlled
by heat pipes alone.
4. I. i. 5 Summary of Hazardous Materials/Systems
These Tug systems will require checkout and servicing
during ground processing. The following hazardous materials are
carried by the Tug and are of concern in processing the Tug:
• LO 2
• LI-IZ
• Hydrazine
• High Pressure Helium
• High Pressure Nitrogen
• Pyrotechnics
• Electrical
• Pyrotechnics
• Batteries
4.1.2
• Hydraulics
SEPS Description
The SEPS is a versatile and efficient unmanned space vehicle
that can complement the Shuttle and the Orbit-to-Orbit Shuttle/Tug for
both earth-orbital and planetary missions. It can retrieve, as well as
deliver, large payloads from geosynchronous orbit, or perform space
servicing of several geosynchronous satellites during a single mission.
The SEPS can also transport payloads to planets, comets, and asteriods
that are difficult or unreasonable with chemical vehicles alone. The
earth orbital version was selected for this study.
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This multipurpose space vehicle that only weighs about
6,000 ib, can generate a total impulse equivalent to a 24,000-Ib
chemical stage. This is achieved with the 3000 sec specific impulse
of a low thrust ion propulsion system.
Figure 17 presents the basic earth orbital SEDS configuration
The primary subsystems on SEPS are described below.
4. I. 2. I Propulsion
The basic power source of SEPS is the dual solar array
(131- by 1230-in. each), which provides 21 kW of power. It is assumed
that the solar arrays will not be extended during ground processing at
KSC. This is primarily due to the space and complex fixturing require-
ments for 1 g operation.
The thrust is provided by an ion thruster array assembly
consisting of nine gimballed thrusters (seven normal and two spare).
The thruster array has a translation mechanism that will position any
thruster 2 in. past the SEPS center line.
The propellant, mercury (3200 ib), is fed by Freon 113
pressurant. At worst case it is assumed that this propellant and
pressurant must be loaded during ground processing at KSC.
4. i. 2.2 Reaction Control
This system, required for orientation during coast and
docking, consists of 18 thrusters and Z hydrazine storage tanks with
appropriate valving. The propellant is pressurized by GN Z.
4.1.2.3 Energy Storage and Distribution
The system provides the flight batteries, converters,
inverters, battery chargers, regulators, etc., required for the payload
and onboard systems.
4. 1.2.4 Miscellaneous Systems
Other systems onboard requiring checkout (no significant
servicing functions) during ground processing include the data handling,
command computer, guidance and control, docking, and communications
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systems. However, the docking system includes a laser device that
induces a unique hazard during checkout,
4. 1.2.5 Summary of Hazardous Materials/Systems
The hazardous materials/systems for ground processing are:
• Mercury (_ 3000 lbs)
High Pressure Freon 113
• Hydrazine
High Pressure GN 2
• Pyrotechnic
• Laser Radar
• High Temperature (Heater)
• Electrical
• Batte rie s.
4.1.3 SEOS Description
The mission of SEOS is to investigate sensing techniques
for measuring environmental phenomena from a geosynchronous orbit.
Typical phenomena to be studied are tornadoes, hurricanes, hail storms,
air pollution, floods, water pollution/biological productivity," navigational
hazards, soil moisture, water availability, forest fires, shoreline
erosion, and crop infestation.
The major piece of equipment onboard is a Cassegrainian
telescope,including a light baffle and focusing mechanism. The sensor
assembIy includes the foIlowing:
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Quantity
I
IZ
9
6
1
Description
Linear Silicon Diode Array
Photomultiplier s
Silicon Detectors
Mercury Cadmium Telluride Detectors
Immersed Thermistor Bolometer
4.1.3.1
are hydrazine, high pressure GN2, electrical,
A/so, there is a data collection system and antenna for
data management. Figure 18 presents a preliminary sketch of the SEOS
concept.
Supporting subsystems include:
• Structure-- cruciform structure.
• Environmental Control-- passive cooling with heat pipes.
• Guidance and Navigation--sun and earth sensors,
star trackers, and momentum wheels.
o Propulsion--hydrazine thruster system for orbit
trim, station keeping, and momentum wheel unloading.
• Telemetry, Tracking, Command--transponder for range
and rage rate, s-band telemetry.
• Electrical--two rotating solar arrays. Direct energy
transfer-type power conditioning.
Summary of Hazardous Materials
The only hazardous materials of concern in processing SEOS
RF, and pyrotechnics.
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4.2 PROCESSING SCENARIO
The Tug/SEPS/SEOS processing scenario shows a likely
sequence of operations essential to process this cargo for the prelaunch,
launch, and post-flight phases of its operational cycle. Buildings and
areas have been identified that most reasonably accommodate the major
operations required to process the individual elements (Tug, SEPS, and
SEOS) of this cargo as well as those for the combined cargo.
Throughout the analysis there has been a continuous endeavor
to evolve the best practical sequence of activities for a reasonably safe
and timely set of prelaunch and post-launch processing plans. This has
been reflected in our selection of the relative placement of activities
with respect to one another and the location where performed.
The scenario (Figure 19) covers the full cycle of operations
as follows:
Tug is off-loaded at KSC airstrip and transported to
SAEF #1 where it is inspected, shipped loose parts assembled,
and the auxiliary propulsion system loaded and safed.
The SEPS and SEOS are moved from the air strip to
the AE Hanger where each is inspected, shipped loose
parts assembledj and functionally tested. They are
then transported to the Propellant Lab 60A where in
the case of SEPSj both the auxiliary propulsion system
and the low thrust propulsion system are loaded with
hydrazine and mercury, respectively. The SEOS
propulsion system is_ also, loaded at 60A.
SEPS and SEOS are transferred to SAEF #I where they
are mated with the Tug to form the designated cargo.
While at SAEF #1, the cargo undergoes integrated
systems tests and the installation of Class A
ordnance. Since the cargo is to be loaded at the
pad through the I:_ZR, it is installed in a canister and
transported to the launch pad.
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At the pad, the PCR is extended and the cargo loaded
canister is lifted from a transporter into the PCR.
The batteries are installed, the main power bus is
verified, and the cargo is installed in the Orbiter
bay. The Orbiter/cargo interfaces are made and
verified, the Orbiter bay is closed, and the PCR
is retracted.
During the countdown, the Shuttle propellants are
loaded and the Tug Main Propulsion System is loaded
with cryogenics.
In-flight operations are performed and cargoes are
exchanged. It was assumed, for this analysis, that
the returning cargo would also be a Tug/SEPS/
SEOS to establish a full operational cycle
for such a cargo. Prior to the actual retrieval of
the cargo, some safing operations are performed,
and after the cargo has been retrieved into the
Orbiter bay more sating activities take place. These
constitute in-flight safing as shown on the scenario.
Assuming a normal Orbiter landing, Orbiter safing
takes place prior to towing the Orbiter to the OPF.
At the OPF, the cargo is removed from the Orbiter
and transported to SAEF #1 where SEOS and SEPS
are demated from the Tug. All three elements
(Tug, SEPS, and SEOS) are deactivated.
SEPS and SEOS are prepared for transporting and are
returned to their respective vendors for refurbishment.
The Tug is refurbished at SAEF #1 and either sent
to storage, or put back into operation.
In addition to the normal processing base line previously
discussed, five contingency situations are presented. Two contingency
situations at the pad are shown:
• Backout Operations
• Vertical Changeout
The third contingency, Mission Abort, is shown as an
alternative to the normal in-flight operations. The fourth and fifth
contingencies are:
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Landing at Alternate Site
• Crash Landing
These are presented as alternatives to the normal landing
operations at KSC and contingency flow plans for these situations are
included in Volume 4.
4.3 PROCESSING FLOWS
This section presents the Tug/SEPS/SEOS Launch Site
Processing Flow Plans that were derived during this study. These flow
plans identify each major operation necessary to prepare the payload for
flight and post-flight refurbishment and acknowledge the payloadhazardous
parameters that exist during these operations.
A top-level flow was developed to show individual payload
operations, cargo operations, launch operations, and post-launch
operations. This top-level flow is essentially an index of _perations
at different areas and was expanded into a detailed operational sequence
for each cargo. This detailed operational sequence was an iterative
process and through a series of iterative tradeoffs the normal base line
processing flow plans were formed.
4.3. 1 Top-Level
While the scenario for the Tug/SEPS/SEOS cargo shows
basic and essential operations to enable its processing, a slightly different
format was established to be used as a top level functional flow, The top-
level Tug/SEPS/SEOS Launch Site Processing Flow Plan is presented
in Figure Z0. This figure shows nine major areas that provide
convenient breakouts for the second level functional flows and have been
addressed at the first level. A brief description of each block in this
processing sequence is provided. Contingency and reference blocks
are included on this chart to show the chronological relationship of the
activities (these blocks will not be discussed in this section).
• 1.0
• Z. 0
• 3.0
Tug Premate Processing
SEPS Premate Processing
SEOS Premate Processing
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• 4. 0 Cargo Mating and Prelaunch Processing
• 5.0 Pad Operations
• 6. 0 Landing, Safing, and Demating Operations
• 7. 0 Tug Refurbishment Operations
• 8.0 SEPS Refurbishment Operations
• 9. 0 SEOS Refurbishment Operations
4.3.2 Normal Base Line
The Tug/SEPS/SEOS second level functional flow diagram
referred to as the normal base line processing flow is an expansion of
the first level with sufficient details to enable a hazards analysis to be
performed from the second level functional event sheets.
The Normal Base Line Processing Flow (Figure Z I)
represents the output of an iterative process. Many feasible options in
sequencing certain activities were examined and cursory analyses were
made to weigh their respective advantages and disadvantages considering
the parameters of safety, time, and facilities. Through this process
some hazardous operations were either eliminated, reduced, or replaced
by less hazardous ones, or the sequence and/or locations changed so as
to have a lesser impact. This process led to the evolvement of the
normal base line processing flow. For each individual item on these
flows, a functional event sheet was prepared to define the operation to
a level necessary to identify all hazards, estimate operations times,
and identify GSE.
Certain basic assumptions were made during the formulation
of the normal base line processing flows. These are discussed below.
Mission--It is assumed, for study continuity, that an
expended Tug/SEPS/SEOS is returned.
Insulation Purge--Because of the preliminary nature of
the data available, the high performance insulation (HPI)
purge requirements are uncertain. To cover all cases,
continuous purge is used during preflight processing for
the SEPS and SEOS and no purge is used during ground
processing of Tug. It is assumed that the Tug HPI is
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dried with hot GN Z, purged with He, and sealed during
refurbishment. This seal is assumed to be good
throughout preflight processing. It is further assumed
that the HPI on SEPS and SEOS will be replaced during
refurbishment.
Refurbishment--It is assumed that the major Tug
refurbishment activity is performed at KSC and that,
because of the highly specialized equipment require-
ments, the SEPS and SEOS are returned to the vendor
for refurbishment.
Other--To explore the processing of the mercury hazard
on SEPS, it is assumed that the mercury and its pres-
surant, Freon 113, are loaded during processing (and
not preloaded at the vendor).
4.3.3 Options to Normal Base Line and Trade Studies
In the development of the Normal Base Line Processing Flows,
alternate flow plans were studied and analyzed to develop the optimum
operational sequence of flow for processing the Tug/SEPS/SEOS cargo.
These options present areas of the normal base line processing flow
concept that required additional study and trade offs to ensure the
selection and development of the most feasible and time/cost effective
approach as far as the safety aspects are concerned.
Four major options to the Tug/SEPS/SEOS selected normal
base line concept were investigated:
• Load cargo into Orbiter at the OPF
-- Not fueled
-- SEPS fueled.
Load Tug only into Orbiter at OPF then mate SF.PS
and SEOS with Orbiter at the pad.
• Load unfueled cargo into Orbiter at the pad.
Load cargo into the Orbiter at the pad with the SEPS
fueled and the APS systems fueled but not pressurized.
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Each of the options has advantages and disadvantages.
Many parameters were considered in making our base line selection,
such as types of propellants, processing time, checkout considerations,
and effect of hazard. The fourth option was selected as the most
advantageous for the normal base line from a practical safety standpoint.
The primary driver for selecting the fourth option was the
problems associated with mercury, which is the SEPS's primary pro-
pulsion systems fuel. Because of the dispersive nature of mercury, a
mercury leak could result in a mission scrub" because of payloads and
Orbiter contamination,which would require major refurbishment. The
high surface tension and low viscosity properties of mercury cause it
to break into small droplets upon impact. These droplets, some smaller
than the eye can see, can cause electrical shorts and corrosion. Mer-
cury cannot be readily absorbed or disolved and there are no practical
solvents that can be used. In case of mercury leakage, disassembly
will usually be required for cleanup.
Considering the constraints imposed by a mercury fueled
SEPS, the cargo should be installed as late in the processing as possible.
This would eliminate the option of loading the cargo into Orbiter at
the OPF with the SEPS fueled. Considering the mercury loading
process as resulting in the highest likelihood of spills, loading the
SEPS with mercury after installation in the Orbiter bay would be very
hazardous. This consideration would eliminate the options of loading
the unfueled cargo into Orbiter at the pad and at the OPF. The difficulty
from an access standpoint of integrating a payload in the cargo bay and
the extended on line time required to integrate the SEPS and SEOS to the
Tug along with the testing time required, eliminated the option of loading
the Tug only into Orbiter at OPF and then mating SEPS and SEOS with
Orbiter at the pad. The option of loading cargo into the Orbiter at
the pad with the SEPS fueled and the APS systems fueled but not
pressurized was most desirable because the SEPS loading was
performed before mating and integration thereby minimizing other
hardware exposure to mercury contamination, by a spill during loading.
Integration of the payloads prior to mating with the Orbiter allows
adequate time for cargo testing without affecting the Orbiter on line
time.
4.4 FUNCTIONAL EVENTS DESCRIPTION
The purpose of these functional event sheets is to describe
each Tug/SEPS/SEOS processing operation, give the sequence of events
required to complete the operation, and estimate the time required. For
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each event in the operation, potential hazardous conditions are noted and
cross-referenced to a hazards analysis. GSE and facilities associated
with this operation are also shown. Hazardous materials or systems
loaded or activated in a previous operation are indicated by hazard
category.
The operation sequence portion of these functional event
sheets define each of the Tug/SEPS/SEOS normal base line processing
flow operations to a level necessary to identify all hazards, estimate
operations times, and identify GSE. Eighty-eight normal base line
processing flow operations were identified for the Tug/SEPS/SEOS
cargo. Potentially hazardous conditions were identified as being
associated with 64 of these 88 operations.
The functional event sheets for the Tug/SEPS/SEOS normal
base line processing flow operations are in Appendix C.
4.5 WATERFALL/TIME LINE
The Tug /SEPS/SEOS Waterfall/Time line provides a visual
guide to the series and parallel relationship of the various processing flow
operations and is time-phased to show the time allocation for each
operation. The processing flow operations were base lined early in this
study in accordance with KSC Shuttle/Tug Turnaround Allocation, August
Z8, 1974. These time lines were not updated by subsequent changes or
modifications to the operational allocations since these changes were not
detrimental to the results of this study. The numbers and titles appearing
on the events refer to the Tug/SEPS/SEOS functional flow diagram item
num be r s.
4.5.1 Normal Base Line
The normal base line processing flow time line is illustrated
in Figure ZZ. This time line shows the complete flow of each element of
this cargo from arrival at KSC to launch, for preflight operations, and
from Orbiter landing to completion of refurbishment for post-flight opera-
tions. The Tug, SEPS, and SEOS are individually followed (through
SAEF #I, AE Building, and Propellant Lab 60A) until they are mated into
an integrated cargo at approximately 60 hr prior to launch. The pad
time for this cargo is 30 hr. The Shuttle events for this time line are
referenced but are not identified.
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The initiation of cargo post-flight operations are constrained
by the Ii hr of Orbiter safing operations.
4.6 GSE AND FACILITY REQUIREMENTS
This section presents the major GSE and facility requirements
for processing operations that have been identified as a result of the
processing flows. These items are recognized as essential for the
successful processing of the cargo.
Any experiment unique GSE will be furnished by the user,
with the possible exception of transportation items or other items KSC
may agree to furnish upon request. It was originally planned that specific
experiment equipment would also be identified. However, there is
insufficient information available to be definitive of particular experiments.
Some facility requirements were envisaged to support different experi-
ment groups, however,
For the Tug/SEPS/SEOS cargo,a support equipment listing
of required equipment to meet specific processing requirements and
functions was prepared. From this listing, support equipment identification
sheets were prepared for servicing equipment and facility items that were
new, peculiar, or associated with hazardous operations.
The Support Equipment Listings were separated into facility
equipment, identified with a "F" number, and a powered cargo, identified
with a "P" number. The "P" identification was further divided into
servicing, handling and access, electrical, transportation, and mis-
cellaneous by the addition of a appropriate second letter.
For the Tug/SEPS/SEOS cargo, 21 items of facility equipment
and approximately 140 items of support equipment have been recognized
as a result of the processing flows. From this listing, support equipment
identification sheets were prepared for some items.The title, basic function,
and description of these items are shown on these sheets. The support
equipment listing for the following Tug/SEPS/SEOS equipment categories
is included in Appendix D:
• Facility
• Electrical
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• Handling and Access
• Servicing
• Transportation
Miscellaneous.
4.7 PROCESSING HAZARDS SUMMA_R Y
Twenty hazard types have been identified with 64 operational
events in the Tug Cargo Normal Base Line Processing Flow. These
hazard types, their HMEA number, the frequency with which they
occur, and the final hazard categorization after the application of
hazard reduction methods are as follows:
Hazard Types
HMEA
Number
Frequency of
Occurrence
Final Hazard
Categorization
GN 2 Purge::: H002
High Pressure GN_: -_ H004
High Pressure He _ H005
Electrical Power _:-_ H006
RF Emissions H007
Hydrazine and Methyl
Derivative s _:_ H008
Laser H009
High Temperature--
Elec. Heaters H010
Moving EquiPment H0 1 1
F reon;: , H0 12
Mer cury_:, H013
APS Thruster Firing--
Toxic Gas H014
Ordnance - - Safed _'; H015
Pyrotechnics - -Armed_:-" H0 17
Batteries -':: H019
Cryogenic LOz_:_ HOZ0
Cyrogenic LH2_ H0Z l
High Pressure --GN2/
GHe_':-" HOZ2
15 Controlled
8 Catastrophic
8 Catastrophic
Z6 Controlled
4 Controlled
6 Critical
1 Controlled
1 Controlled
1 Controlled
1 Catastrophic
2 Controlled
2 Critical
2 Critical
5 Controlled
2 Controlled
4 Controlled
3 Critical
4 Critical
1 Catastrophic
2 Controlled
Also, continue or carry over to other operations and present the
possibility of interface or interaction effects during subsequent
operations.
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Hazard Types
HMEA
Number
Frequency of
Occurrence
Final Hazard
Categorization
Hydraulics
Purge With Hot GN 2
H023 l Controlled
H039 1 Controlled
4.7.1
Hazard Mode and Effects Analysis
Functional Event Sheets for the Tug/SEPS/SEOS Normal
Processing Base Line flagged each hazardous operation for a hazard
analysis. By examining each operational event {where a hazard or
hazards had been uncovered) in conjunction with the HMEA of that type
of hazard (e.g., laser and electrical), a determination of the initial
hazard impact on the payload, cargo, facilities, Orbiter, and personnel
was made. The impact whether catastrophic, critical, or controlled
and what was affected, such as payload and cargo, was indicated on the
Normal Processing Base Line Flow along with the final categorization
that shows the result after the application of control measures listed on
the HMEA for that hazard type. The HMEA's for the Z0 hazard types
shown in Paragraph 4. 7 are located in Appendix E.
4.7.2 Interface Hazards
If the hazard were a "one event only" hazard, it was indicated
on the flow chart by a hexagon. If the hazard were one that would con-
tinue over several operational events, it was indicated by a circle and
a line was run from the source event to the terminal event where the
hazard was closed out with a hexagon. Events containing more
than one hazard may have interface hazards associated with them,
and also, events where hazards are contained from previous events
operating on or operated on by an event initiated hazard can also have
interface hazards. In this manner, the processing flow clearly shows
all possible hazard interactions for each operation.
An interface hazard represents a potential accident type that
could occur if one hazard source were to go out-of-control (an accident)
and operate on another potential hazard source causing it to also go
out-of-control. In accidents resulting from an interface, the combined
effects are often a different and/or worse (synergistic) effect than the
singular uncombined effects of either.
In the Tug/SEPS/SEOS Normal Base Line Processing Flow,
events present potential interface hazards. These hazards and their
potential effects are described below:
10
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Tug Event 1.07 - Perform Instrumentation and Com-
munications Systems Tests
Tug Event 7. 09 - Check Out Instrumentation and Com-
munications Systems Tests
• SEPS Event Z. I0 - Test Communication System
SEOS Event 3. 08 - Test Telemetry Tracking and
Command Systems.
In each of these events, electrical power is applied to make
checks and verifications of various communications and instrumenta-
tion networks. Either through human error or equipment malfunction,
power could be inadvertently applied to the RF links,thereby producing
RF emissions. The RF emissions can cause human injury and result
in the malfunction of sensitive equipment within the range of the
radiation field.
Similarily, electrical power application to make various
other checks and verifications during normal processing operations
could lead to additional interface hazards such as:
• SEPS Event Z. 09 - Test G&N System.
Inadvertent power application to the laser radar during veri-
fication of the proper operation of the major CJ&N elements could
lead to exposure of personnel and equipment to the laser beam, thereby
resulting in possible personnel injury, fire, and/or equipment damage.
• SEPS Event 2. 11 - Test Thermal Control System.
Electrical power application to the heaters to verify their
operation in the Thermal Control System could result in an interface
hazard. Should the heaters inadvertently not be shut down, or power
accidentally applied to them after the test was complete, either through
human error or heater malfunction, it is possible that an uncontrolled
combustion could occur. This could result in the release of hot or toxic
gases and possible personnel injury or fire and contamination.
• SEPS Event Z. 12 - Test Mechanism and Valve Actuation
The application of electrical power is made to verify the
command and control of the thruster gimbals in this event. Through
a malfunction or human error, the inadvertent application of electrical
I03
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power to the system at some other time could result in personnel injury
and equipment damage.
• SEPS Event Z. 16 - Test Fire APS
• SEOS Event 3. ii - Test Fire MPS
The thrusters are fired to check the operation of the propul-
sion systems. A thruster malfunction could result in the spillage of
hydrazine, which in turn could be ignited by electrical power malfunction.
This could result in a possible fire or explosion_leading to possible
personnel injury and damage to equipment and facility.
Cargo Event 5. 09 - Connect Orbiter/Cargo Interfaces and
Verify
In this event, electrical power is applied to verify the various
Orbiter/cargo interfaces. Inadvertent power application to the pyro-
technic devices could result in an explosion or fire, which in turn could
ignite the hydrazine released by the explosion, resulting in personnel
injury and/or damage to the cargo and Orbiter.
4.8 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND LAUNCH SITE PROTECTION
Identification of the 20 types of hazards associated with the
Tug Cargo Normal Base Line Processing Flow has presented the require-
ment for providing recommendations and/or preventative measures
that could help to alleviate the severity/occurrence of the hazard.
The detailed safety, operational, and facility requirements for each of
these Z0 hazards are presented in Appendix E. A summary of the more
pertinent requirements that have been established for each of the
identified hazards is presented below:
• GN 2 Purge (H002) and Hot GN 2 Purge (H039)
The prevention of per sonnel injury from asphyxiation can be
effected most readily by limiting the access of personnel to areas
where purge operations are being conducted, and to provide proper
ventilation or self-contained breathing apparatus for those persons that
must enter the area. Proper use Of restraints or tiedowns and
vent/relief capability can help preclude rupture of high pressure vessels
and lines, and thereby prevent damage to personnel and equipment
caused by whipping of unsecured lines, etc.
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• High Pressure GN Z (H004) and High Pressure He (H005)
High pressure testing or checking of tanks/lines/fittings
always presents the hazard of a rupture or burst that 'could result in
personnel injury and damage to facilities and equipment. Remote
operation or, where required, provision for restricted access and
appropriate caution and warning procedures can considerably reduce
the exposure of personnel to such hazards.
• Electrical Power (H006)
Probably the single most effective means for preventing
electrical shock to personnel is through the use of GFI devices. The
use of proper operational procedures, checklists, and safety interlocks
will help prevent the inadvertent creation of associated electrical
hazards, such as arcing and high voltage discharge, which can result
in fires and damage to equipment.
• RF Emissions (H007)
The wearing of RF monitors by operating personnel can
effectively limit their exposure to such harmful radiation. All RF
generating equipment should be turned off before performing hazardous
operations, such as connecting pyrotechnics devices.
• Hydrazine and its Methyl Derivatives (H008)
The obvious requirements of wearing protective clothing,
masks, and gloves and having safety showers and eye wash fountains
readily accessible will in most cases preclude an accidental spill having
a marked effect on personnel. Modifications to the SAEF #1 facility
to include a water flush system and a fresh air purge may be required
for loading and testing the APS safely.
• Laser (H009)
A laser checkout facility should be used to limit access to the
area during testing, and to provide barriers and curtains to contain the
reflected light. Eye shields should be worn at alltimes during tests
with lasers.
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• High Temperature Electric Heaters (H010)
Personnel should wear protective garments, gloves, etc.,
at all times when working with sources of high temperature. All com-
bustible materials must be removed from the immediate area before
the heaters are energized.
• Moving/Rotating Equipment (HO1 l)
Provision must be made to limit access and clear the area
before operating movable or extendable equipment and to ensure that
there is no interference with the moving equipment during planned
operations.
• Freon (H0 IZ)
Adequate facility ventilation and avoidance of smoking or open
flames in the area where halocarbon vapors may be present should pre-
clude most hazardous conditions to personnel from these materials.
• Mercury (H013)
Adequate ventilation and provision to rapidly clean up any
spilled mercury should prevent most harmful effects of mercury vapor
on operating personnel.
• APS Thruster Firing Toxic Gas (H014)
Test firing of these thrusters could generate toxic products
such as ammonia and hydrogen, or through malfunction could create a
spill of hydrazine. Adequate ventilation and the use of personal pro-
tective equipment should preclude any hazard to personnel from this
ope ration.
• Pyrotechnics Safed (H015)
The inadvertent activation of ordnance devices can be pre-
cluded by the following proper procedures, such as using spark proof
tools, use of shorting caps, and handling and storing explosions onlyin
designated facilities.
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• Pyrotechnics Armed (H017)
Before removing shorting caps from EED's and connecting
pryotechnic devices, checks should be made for RF or magnetic fields
and for energized electrical connectors.
• Batteries (H019)
Care must be exercised in handling batteries to prevent
arcing/shorts and to prevent electrolytic spills. The use of nonsparking
tools and wearing of protective clothing and goggles should serve to
alleviate most of these hazards.
• Cryogenic LO Z (H020)
Operations involving LO Z significantly increase the fire
hazard associated with combustible materials in the area. Working with
cryogenics necessitates the wearing of personal protective gear, such
as masks, and gloves to prevent personnel injury.
• Cryogenic LH 2 HOZI
Adequate ventilation during operations involving LH 2 can help
prevent possible asphyxiation of personnel and the possibility of a fire
or explosion. The cryogenic lines should be drained, purged, and warmed
to ambient temperature before breaking connections to prevent spills,
etc.
• High Pressure--GNz/GHe (HOZ2)
All operations involving the test, checkout, and operation of
high pressure systems should be done remotely in as much as possible,
i.e. limiting access and number of operating personnel. All OSE
services should be vented and safed before disconnecting.
• Hydraulics (H023)
These systems should be treated for hazardous conditions
just as other high pressure systems, with the added hazard that spills or
leaks could lead to a possible fire hazard.
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4.9 PAYLOAD SAFETY RELATED RECOMMENDED CRITERIA
Identification of the 20 types of hazards associated with
the Tug Cargo Normal Base Line Processing Flow has also presented
the requirement for providing pertinent payload design criteria that
could help reduce the severity or occurrence of the hazard. The
detailed criteria set forth for each of these hazards are provided in
Appendix E. A brief summary of the more significant criteria emanating
from this study is presented below:
• GN 2 Purge (H00Z) and Hot GN z Purge (H039)
No payload design requirements were found to be applicable
to this hazard.
• High Pressure GN Z (H004) and He (H005)
All high pressure tanks should be designed with pressure
relief valves to limit pressure and the tanks should be designed to limit
shrapnel in case of a inadvertent rupture or burst. Pressurized
flight systems should be connected to the Orbiter vent system to allow
venting before returning from orbit.
• Electrical Power (H006)
All electrical equipment, connectors, etc., should conform to
the provisions of the National Electrical Code and the applicable NASA
and MIL Standards. The designs of safety critical switches and con-
trols should be such that they are readily accessible in the event of
a major incident.
• RF Emissions (H007)
Equipment that generates EMI radiation should be designed
to contain this radiation within the equipment and equipment that
can be adversely affected by RFI should have RF shielding built into
its de sign.
• Hydrazine and its Methyl Derivatives (H008)
The Orbiter/GSE umbilicals should be designed to limit
spillage of fuels at the pad or other loading areas to a minimum.
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• Laser (H009)
Safety related design features for laser operations should
include electrical/mechanical interlocks to prevent inadvertent
energization, limiters, or stops to limit pointing direction, and a control
and warning system to provide a warning if the beam is out-of-limits.
• High Temperature Electric Heaters (H010)
Electrical/mechanical interlocks should be incorporated
into the system to prevent inadvertent energization.
• Moving Equipment (H01 I)
All moving/rotating equipment should be provided with limit
stops or shields to preclude contact with the equipment during operation.
• Freon (H01Z)
All systems using pressurized gases should include pro-
visions for the relief of overpressure and for the venting of the systems
in orbit.
• Mercury (H013)
Consideration should be given to designing mercury tanks and
lines that are double sealed or contained to prevent leaks into the
atmosphere or the Cargo Bay. The payload mercury tanks should not
be brought up to operating pressure until the payload is deployed from
the Orbiter in space.
• APS Thruster Firing --Toxic Gas (H014)
Design of the A_PS systems should include electrical inter-
locks to preclude inadvertent firing of the system, and provision should
be made to bring the APS system up to operating pressure only just
before deployment from the Orbiter in space.
• Pyrotechnics Safed (H015)and Armed (H017)
Ordnance firing- circuits must be designed so that after one
failure, a second failure will not fire the circuit. The payload design
should include the location of the pyrotechnic initiators for easy
accessibility when the cargo is in the Orbiter Bay.
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• Batteries (H0 19)
Battery and battery connector designs should include the use
of plug-in type connectors to cut down the possibility of arcing. The
batteries should also have adequate vents that are connected to the
Orbiter vent system that would preclude possible battery case over-
pressure.
• Cryogenic LO 2 (HOg0)
Because of the shock sensitivity of a number of materials
in LOz, all seals and lubricants used must be compatible with LOg. To
avoid overpressurization, the fuel cell and LOX tanks should have
redundant vent and relief valves that are connected to the Orbiter vent
system.
• Cryogenic LH z (H021)
As for the LO 2 systems design, the fuel cell and LH z tanks
should have redundant vent and relief valves that are connectedto the
Orbiter vent system. Where feasible, all such toxic/hazardous pro-
pellant systems should not be pressurized until just before deployment
from the Orbiter in orbit.
• High Pressure GN2/GHe (HOZZ)
Design criteria applicable to GN 2 and GHe have been dis-
cussed previously under (H004) and (H005).
• Hydraulics (H0Z3)
All payloads flown in the Shuttle should use non or low-
flammable hydraulic fluids to reduce the hazards associated with these
fluids.
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